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Introduction
Appreciated or depreciated property may be contributed to a busi-
ness enterprise in exchange for an ownership interest' either on the
initial organization of an enterprise or at a time when new capital is
being infused into an operating enterprise. The federal income tax
effects of such transactions may differ, depending not only on the form
of the enterprise but also on whether the enterprise is newly organized
or operating. Such transactions will have an economic impact on both
the investor who is contributing the appreciated or depreciated prop-
erty (the contributing investor) and, more importantly, the other
investors (the noncontributing investors). Consequently, whenever
appreciated or depreciated property is contributed to an enterprise,
consideration should be given to possible adjustments in the business
bargain among the investors in order to take account of the federal
income tax effects. Indeed, if adjustments are not made, either the con-
tributing investor or the noncontributing investors may realize an eco-
nomic detriment while the other realizes an economic benefit. The
intensity of the detriment or benefit will be directly related to the
* B.S., West Chester State College 1965; M.A., University of Pennsylvania
(Wharton) 1969; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School (1971); LL.M.
(In Taxation), New York University School of Law (1973). Mr. Thompson is
presently an associate with the law firm of Davis, Polk & Wardwell in New York
City. Most of the work on this article was completed while Mr. Thompson was
an Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law.
1 The term "ownership interest" refers to both general and limited partnership
interests and in the case of corporations to both stock and securities.
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amount of the appreciation or depreciation in the value of the con-
tributed property.
This article is an examination of the policy implications of the federal
income tax effects of contributions of appreciated or depreciated prop-
erty to partnerships,2 subchapter C corporations 3 and subchapter S
corporations 4 in exchange for an ownership interest.5 An understand-
ing of the tax policy implications of contribution transactions " can aid
the tax advisor in counseling a client who is involved in such transac-
tions. The client may be the contributing investor, the business enter-
prise or a noncontributing investor or investors.
In most cases the treatment of contributions to subchapter S corpora-
tions is governed by the rules applicable to subchapter C corporations,
and in such cases no differentiation is made herein between the two
types of corporations. Notwithstanding this equivalent treatment, the
underlying economic relationships among the shareholders and the cor-
2 The taxation of partners and partnerships is governed by subchapter K of
chapter 1 of sections 701-771 of the Code.
The term "subchapter C corporation" as used here means a corporation which
is subject to all the provisions of subchapter C of chapter 1 of the Code, sections
301-395. The Code provides special tax treatment for various other types of
corporations.
' The term "subchapter S corporation" as used here means a corporation which
has made a valid election to be taxed pursuant to the provisions of subchapter S
of chapter 1 of the Code, sections 1371 through 1379. A subchapter S corpora-
tion is subject to the provisions of subchapter C except where otherwise specifi-
cally provided in subchapter S.
IThe leading treatise on the federal income taxation of partnerships is
WILLIS ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION (1971) (herein cited as WILLIS), and the
leading treatise on corporations and shareholders, including subchapter S corpora-
tions, is BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS (3d ed. 1971) (herein cited as BITTKER & EUSTICE). A combina-
tion casebook and treatise covering both partnership and corporate taxation is
SURREY, WARREN, MCDANIEL & AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1972)
(herein cited as SURREY); see also NESS & VOGEL, TAXATION OF THE CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATION (1972); WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE (1971).
For a comparative analysis of the tax impact of operating the three forms, see
Thompson, The Federal Income Tax Impact of the Operating Function On The
Choice of Business Form: Partnership, Subchapter C Corporation, or Subchapter
S Corporation, 4 BLACK L.J. 11 (1975) (herein cited as THOMPSON). For other
works treating various areas, see Axelrad, Choice of Form: Partnership, Corpora-
tion, or in Between, 19 N.Y.U. INST. 361 (1961); Dixon, Barnett, Evall, Geller &
Kalish, Partnerships and Subchapter S: A Comparison of Tax Advantages, a
Panel Discussion, 25 N.Y.U. INST. 151 (1967); Grant, Alden, Kaufman & Lees,
The Relative Tax Advantages of Partnerships and Subchapter S Corporations,
1969 S. CALIF. INST. 409; and Kalish, Partnerships, Subchapter S, and Non-
Special-Status Corporations, 28 N.Y.U. INST. 509 (1970).
6 The term "contribution transactions" refers to transfers of property to an
enterprise in exchange for ownership interests.
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poration may be different, and in such cases the results for subchapter S
corporations will be discussed separately from those for the subchapter
C corporation.
The contribution transactions considered here are limited to those in
which property (other than services) is contributed to an enterprise -
in exchange solely for an ownership interest. The author intends this
to be the first of a series of three articles dealing with various aspects
of contribution transactions. The second and third will deal respec-
tively with contribution transactions involving boot distributions (in-
cluding liabilities assumptions) and contributions of services.
This article is concerned with three separate aspects of contribution
transactions:
(1) The policy implications of the control concept in the case of
corporations and the absence of such a concept for partnerships.
(2) The policy implications of the potential for the assignment
of tax detriment or benefit among the investors. The scope includes,
but is broader than, the traditional assignment of income issues. In-
deed, the problems of assignment of tax detriment or benefit is the
genus which includes among its species traditional assignment of
income issues.
(3) The policy implications of the potential for a double tax.
The purpose is to probe the flesh of the present provisions to see if
they operate in accordance with a rational tax policy scheme. An un-
derlying policy judgment is that in the absence of countervailing con-
siderations similar contribution transactions involving the three forms
should produce similar federal income tax effects. The goal of this
article is not to address the broader question of whether any of the
three forms should be eliminated; the goal is to explore the possibility
of improving the functioning of the three forms with respect to contri-
bution transactions. It should be pointed out, however, that even if
there are changes in the taxing schemes of the three forms, such as the
elimination of the double tax on dividends as recently proposed by
Treasury Secretary Simon," the problems raised here will nevertheless
persist.
'The three different business forms will sometimes be referred to collectively
as the "enterprises" or the "forms."8 Statement by William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, House Committee
on Ways and Means, July 31, 1975, 975 CCH r 6160. For a recent discussion
of many of the policy issues with respect to the possibility of integrating the cor-
porate and individual income tax, see McLure, Integration of the Personal and
Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,
88 HAv. L. REv. 532 (1975).
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Before beginning the analysis, it is appropriate to briefly review
(1) the federal income tax treatment of each form as an operating en-
tity, and (2) the general principles of federal income taxation which
are applicable to the formation of each form.
General Scheme for Taxing the
Three Forms 9
Partnerships are not subject to the federal income tax.'" Each part-
ner must include in his gross income his share of the partnership's tax-
able income whether such income is distributed or not." Correlatively,
each partner will deduct from his gross income his share of the partner-
ship's losses. 12 Current property or cash distributions from partner-
ships do not, in general, generate income to the partners. 3 Partnerships
can be either general or limited, but for the most part the tax impact of
the operating function will be the same for the two.
A subchapter C corporation is a taxable entity separate and distinct
from its shareholders.14 In general, such corporations are required to
pay a federal income tax on their taxable income for each taxable year,
and shareholders are subjected to a tax liability on receipt of a current
distribution of cash or property from the corporation." Subchapter C
corporations are, therefore, subjected to taxation as entities separate
from the shareholders, whereas partnerships are not.
Subchapter S corporations are tax hybrids; they are in effect crosses
between partnerships and corporations. With respect to the operating
function of the business enterprise, the tax scheme for subchapter S
corporations is for the most part analogous to the tax scheme for part-
nerships. The subchapter S corporation is not, in general, subject to
taxation.1" Each shareholder is required to include in his gross income
his proportionate share of the corporation's taxable income whether or
not distributed. 17 Correlatively, each shareholder will deduct his pro-
portionate share of the corporation's losses."8 The analogy to partner-
ship taxation is not a complete one; the schemes differ to a great extent.
For instance, current property distributions by subchapter S corpora-
"See generally THOMPSON.
1
0 I.R.C. § 701.
11 I.R.C. § 702(a).
12 Ibid.
13 I.R.C. § 731(a).
14 I.R.C. § 11.
Is I.R.C. §§ 301, 312, 316.
16 I.R.C. § 1372(b) (1).
17 1.R.C. § 1373(a).
18 1.R.C. § 1374(a).
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tions, with certain exceptions, will be treated similarly to such distribu-
tions by subchapter C corporations," and subchapter S corporations
may be subject to taxation. 0
Federal Income Tax Consequences of
Formation of an Enterprise
The starting point for determining the tax consequences on the for-
mation of an enterprise is section 1001 (a) 21 of the Code which pro-
vides that the gain or loss on a sale or other disposition of property shall
be the difference between the amount realized " and the property's
adjusted basis.' Generally, realized gain or loss must be recognized 24
(taken into account for tax purposes), except as otherwise provided in
the income tax provisions of the Code. If there is a contribution of
appreciated or depreciated property in exchange for an ownership in-
terest on the organization of an enterprise or on the addition of new
investors to an operating enterprise gain or loss will be realized by both
the contributing investor and the enterprise. The partnership and cor-
porate provisions, however, provide exceptions to the general rule of
recognition for both the contributing investor and the enterprise.?"
19 I.R.C. § 1373(c).20 I.R.C. § 1378.
21 Section 1001(a) reads: "The gain from the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis
provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of
the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount
realized."
-2The amount realized on a sale or other disposition of property is defined in
section 1001(b) as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
the property (other than money) received."
The adjusted basis of property is, in general, the taxpayer's cost of such
property as provided in section 1012, less depreciation (if any), plus or minus
certain other adjustments as provided for in section 1016. The cost of property
received in an exchange is the amount paid for such property which in any arm's
length exchange is presumed to be equal to the fair market value of the property
given up. See Reg. § 1.1012-1(a); cf. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v.
United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. CI. 1954) (held, where the value of prop-
erty received in an arm's length transaction could not be determined, the value
and, therefore, the cost basis of such property was presumed to be the value of
the property given up).24Section 1001(c) provides that a gain or loss realized under section 1001(a)
shall be recognized as provided in section 1002. Section 1002 provides that in
all cases gain or loss which is realized under section 1001 (a) shall be recognized
except as otherwise provided in the income tax provisions of the Code.
2 If there is an exception to the recognition of gain or loss on an exchange, in
order to preserve (defer) the nonrecognized gain or loss the basis of the property
received must be equal to the basis of the property given up. This requires an
exception to the cost basis rule of section 1012. In describing the relationship
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Section 721, the provision governing contributions to partnerships,
reads: "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any
of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partner-
ship in exchange for an interest in the partnership." 20 The price to the
contributing partner of nonrecognition treatment on such transfers is
the requirement in section 722 that the partner take as his basis in the
partnership interest received the basis he had in the property contrib-
uted. -7 This substituted basis has the effect, in general, of deferring the
gain or loss which the partner would have had to recognize in the ab-
sence of the section 721 exception to the general rule of recognition.
Consequently, on a later sale or exchange of the partnership interest, the
partner may recognize his previously nonrecognized gain or loss.
Section 723, as a corollary to section 722, provides that a partner-
ship's basis for property contributed to it by a partner is the partner's
basis for such property at the time of the contribution. 28 Thus, the part-
between the predecessors of (1) the nonrecognition exceptions to the current
section 1002 and (2) the basis exceptions to the current section 1012, the House
report to the 1924 Revenue Act said: "[T]hese provisions result not in an exemp-
tion from tax but in a postponement of tax until the gain is realized by a puro
sale or by such an exchange as amounts to a pure sale." H.R. REP. No. 179,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1924).
26 Section 1.721-1 of the regulations amplifies section 721 in numerous ways.
This regulation makes it clear that the general rule of nonrecognition applies both
to contributions to newly organized partnerships as well as operating partnerships.
Also, the regulation makes it clear that section 721 nonrecognition treatment does
not apply to sales and lease transactions between a partner and partnership. Such
transactions are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of some of the
problems in this area, see WILLIS at 151-60.
Subsection (b) of the regulation provides that section 721 will not apply to the
receipt of a capital interest in a partnership as compensation for services or in
satisfaction of an obligation. Contributions of services in exchange for partner-
ship interests are beyond the scope of this article, see WILLIS at 77-98.
The rule of nonrecognition applies to the recapture of depreciation, sections
1245(b) (3) and 1250(d) (3). Also, pursuant to section 47(b) there is generally
no recapture of investment credit on the contribution of section 38 property.
However, section 1.47-3(f) of the regulations sets up certain requirements for
nonrecognition which are designed to prevent sham transfers of investment credit
property. Further, contributions of installment obligations will not give rise to
recognition. See Reg. §§ 1.721-1(a), 1.453-9(c)(2).
2 Pursuant to section 1223(1) the partner's holding period for his partnership
interest will be determined by reference to the holding period of the capital assets
and section 1231(b) assets transferred, to the extent thereof. This is known as
the tacking of the holding period. It should be noted that to the extent a portion
of the partnership interest is received in respect of other assets, the holding period
does not tack.
28 Pursuant to section 1223 (2) the partnership's holding period for capital assets
and section 1231(b) assets received shall include the transferor's holding period
of such assets. This is also known as tacking.
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nership carries over as its basis in the contributed property the basis of
the contributing partner in such property.2- The effect of the carryover
basis is to transfer from the partner to the partnership the potential gain
or loss the partner would have recognized had he disposed of the prop-
erty in a transaction requiring recognition of gain or loss.
The general results on a contribution of appreciated or depreciated
property to a partnership can be summarized:
(1) The contributing partner does not recognize his potential
gain or loss because section 721 provides an exception to the general
rule of recognition.
(2) Pursuant to section 722, the contributing partner substitutes
as his basis in the partnership interest received the adjusted basis
of the property contributed, thus deferring any potential gain or loss.
(3) Pursuant to section 721, the partnership does not recognize
gain or loss on the exchange of its partnership interest for property.
(4) Pursuant to section 723, the partnership carries over as its
basis in contributed property the basis in such property to the con-
tributing partner.
Section 351 (a), the provision governing contributions to both sub-
chapter C and S corporations, reads in pertinent part:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corpora-
tion... by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities
in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation.
The price of nonrecognition treatment is the requirement in section
358(a)(1) that the shareholder or security holder substitute as his
basis for the stock or securities received the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty contributed. 0
The phrase "stock or securities" is not defined in the Code. In gen-
eral stock refers to common or preferred stock without regard to the
particular characteristics, 31 and securities refers to long-term debt in-
29 The partnership will not necessarily get a carryover basis in the case of a
contribution of personal use property which is depreciable property to the partner-
ship. In such case the partnership's basis for such property is the lesser of the
carryover basis or the fair market value of the property. Reg. § 1.167(g)-i; see
Lawrence Y.S. Au, 40 T.C. 264 (1963), aff'd per curianz, 330 F.2d 1008 (9th
Cir. 1964) (held, on transfer of personal use automobile to partnership, the basis
of the automobile to the partnership was the lesser of the partner's basis or the
fair market value).
30Pursuant to section 1223(1), the shareholder's holding period for his stock
and securities may tack as is the case with partnerships.
31See BrrTKER & EUSTICE at Ch. 4.
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struments of the corporation.3 2 If debt instruments have a short matura-
tion term, they may be classified as other property, rather than securi-
ties, and as such will not qualify for nonrecognition treatment.
Under section 351(a), only transferors in control singly or as a
group can qualify for nonrecognition treatment on the receipt of stock
or securities. 3 Control is defined in section 368(c) to mean ownership
of "at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." The control
must exist "immediately after" the exchange,3" and a group of trans-
ferors are counted together for purposes of determining whether the
requisite control exists, provided the group is jointly making contribu-
tions to the corporation. Furthermore, so long as one person has con-
trol of a corporation he can make a contribution of property 35 to such
corporation at any time and receive nonrecognition treatment. It is not
sufficient that the transferor receive securities only; to be counted in the
control group the transferor must either receive stock in addition to
securities or have owned stock at the time of the receipt of securities.30
In other words, in order to be in the control group the investor must
either become a stockholder or have been a stockholder.
From the corporation's side of the transaction, section 1032 provides
that a corporation will receive nonrecognition treatment on the issu-
ance of stock in exchange for property, and section 118 provides that
a corporation will not have income on the receipt of a contribution to
capital. Also, pursuant to section 1.61-12(c) of the regulations, a cor-
poration will not have income upon the issuance of its securities in ex-
change for property. A corporation's basis for property received in a
section 351 (a) transaction is a carryover basis pursuant to section
362(a).17
The general results on a contribution of property by control persons
32 Ibid.
11 For a discussion of the "control" element, see BITTKER & EUSTICE at 3-29,
et seq.
84 For a discussion of some of the problems revolving around the "immediately
after" element of section 351(a), see BITTKER & EUSTICE at 3-32, et seq.
" For a discussion of the meaning of the term "property" in section 351 (a),
see BITTKER & EUSTICE at 3-10.
3 Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 115 (held, if one of the transferors in a
section 351 transaction receives only securities, he is not within the control group
of section 368(c), and, therefore, has recognition because he lacks a proprietary
interest).
3 Pursuant to section 1223(2), the corporation's holding period for capital
assets and section 1231(b) assets will tack as is the case with partnerships. For
a possible exception to the carryover basis rule, see N. 29 supra.
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to a corporation in exchange solely for stock or securities can be sum-
marized:
(1) The contributing shareholder does not recognize his poten-
tial gain or loss because section 351 (a) provides an exception to the
general rule of recognition.
(2) Pursuant to section 358(a) (1), the contributing shareholder
substitutes as his basis in the stock or securities received the adjusted
basis of the property contributed, thus deferring any potential gain
or loss.
(3) Pursuant to section 1032 and section 1.61-12(c) of the
regulations, the corporation does not recognize gain or loss on the
exchange of its stock or securities for property.
(4) Pursuant to section 362(a), the corporation carries over as
its basis in the contributed property the basis of the shareholders in
such property.
Control Requirement
Comparative Analysis of Control Requirement
Outline of Problem
The principal distinction between the partnership and corporate pro-
visions with respect to the availability of nonrecognition treatment on
the contribution of appreciated or depreciated property is that section
721 provides for nonrecognition treatment for contributions to partner-
ships without regard to the amount of partnership interest received,
whereas, under section 351(a) nonrecognition will obtain only if the
shareholder either has control of the corporation or is a member of a
control group. It may appear that another distinction is the according
of nonrecognition treatment on the receipt of corporate securities under
section 351(a), and the absence of such a provision in section 721.
This distinction would appear to be illusory, however. If securities
were distributed by a partnership in a section 721 transaction, the tax
treatment of the securities would presumably be governed by section
731 which, in general, provides for nonrecognition treatment on the
distribution of property by a partnership.s
At first blush it may seem as though the control requirement in sec-
tion 351 (a) operates as a major disadvantage to investors contributing
18 Research has disclosed no cases or rulings dealing with the tax treatment of
the distribution of securities by a partnership. Partnership securities would, how-
ever, appear to be property, as opposed to cash, and if this assumption is correct,
then pursuant to section 731 there would be no gain to the distributee partner on
receipt of the securities.
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to a corporation as opposed to those contributing to a partnership. The
reverse may be true, however. If depreciated property is contributed
to an enterprise in exchange for an ownership interest, the investor may
want to immediately recognize the loss rather than have the loss shifted
to the enterprise and deferred by reason of the operation of the carry-
over and substituted basis rules. Moreover, even on a contribution of
appreciated property, it may be desirable for the investor to recognize
the gain in order to give the enterprise a higher basis. To take but one
obvious example, if the property contributed is a capital asset to the
investor and either depreciable property or inventory to the enterprise,
immediate recognition at the time of contribution would give the in-
vestor a gain that would be taxed at the preferred capital gain rate, and
the future ordinary income of the enterprise would be reduced by way
of either an increased depreciation charge or a smaller gain on the dis-
position of the inventory.
Neither immediate loss recognition nor immediate capital gain recog-
nition can be attained in the case of a contribution to a partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest. Both can be attained, within cer-
tain limitations, on contributions to corporations in exchange for stock
or securities. As long as the shareholder neither has control nor is a
member of a control group he can recognize gain on the contribution of
property to a corporation in exchange for stock or securities. Loss can
be recognized as long as the shareholder (along with certain related
parties) does not own greater than 50 percent of the stock."
On the formation of a new enterprise there is no inherent difference
between sections 721 and 351 with respect to the control element, be-
cause all of the contributing shareholders will be included in the con-
trol group without regard to the amount of stock received. Although a
shareholder may receive only 1 percent of the stock, he will be given
nonrecognition treatment as long as he is a member of the control
group. Different treatment can occur, however, on the admission of
new investors to an operating enterprise. The following example will
illustrate the potential severity of the divergent treatment. Assume the
AB operating enterprise is going to take in a new investor, C, who will
be transferring to the enterprise as his capital contribution a building
which has a fair market value of $1 00K and an adjusted basis of $1 OK.
If the enterprise is a partnership, the transaction will not give rise to
" Section 267(a) will prevent, inter alia, the recognition of a loss on an ex-
change between a stockholder and a corporation in which the shareholder along
with certain related parties, owns more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding
stock. This has the effect of lowering the section 368(c) control test to 50 per-
cent in the case of a contribution of loss property.
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recognition to C regardless of the amount of partnership interest he re-
ceives in the transaction. On the other hand, if the enterprise is a cor-
poration, the transaction would give rise to recognition to C unless he
received at least 80 percent of the stock of the corporation. Is there a
rational tax policy basis for giving C nonrecognition treatment in a
case where he receives a 1 percent partnership interest, but recognition
treatment when he receives anything less than an 80 percent stock in-
terest in a corporation? This and other questions are considered below.
With creative tax planning the 80 percent barrier to nonrecognition
treatment may be reduced to a low hurdle, but with certain risks. For
instance, assume that A is planning to make a contribution to the X
operating corporation in exchange for less than 80 percent of the X
stock. In order to get nonrecognition treatment, A might form a sep-
arate wholly-owned corporation, Y, to which he would transfer his
assets in a nontaxable section 351 exchange. After operating Y as a
viable entity for a respectable period, X could then acquire the Y stock
from A in exchange for voting stock of X in a section 368 (a)( 1 )(B)
nontaxable reorganization. X could then liquidate Y in a nontaxable
liquidation pursuant to section 332. The end result would be the same
as if A had been a member of a control group in making a section 351
transfer of his assets directly to X. The Commissioner, however, would
probably apply the step transaction and business purpose doctrines to
treat the transactions as a mere purchase by X of A's assets in exchange
for X stock. 0 Crucial to the applicability of those doctrines would be
whether the formation of Y was a part of an interrelated scheme, and
whether its formation had an independent business purpose. If A could
establish that he had bona fide business reasons for forming Y, apart
from the acquisition by X, and that Y was not formed for the purpose
of conveying the assets to X, then he might prevail in having the various
transactions treated as independent steps. The taxpayer in Earl Vest v.
Commissioner4 was successful in beating back the Commissioner's
attempt to treat such a transaction as a mere purchase of assets. The
taxpayer there established that he had independent business reasons for
forming his corporation and that although the corporation was ac-
quired by Standard Oil in a section 368(a) (1) (B) reorganization
shortly after formation, the formation was not "part of an interrelated
scheme." I
4 See Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73; see also BrrrKER & EUSTICE at 3-8
to 3-10.
4157 T.C. 128 (1971), afl'd, 481 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1092 (1973). But cf. Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73.
42 57 T.C. at 145.
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Notwithstanding the potential application of the step transaction and
business purpose doctrines to prevent end runs around the 80 percent
control test, in some cases the taxpayer may be playing a zero sum
game. He may have everything to gain if he wins the game (i.e., non-
recognition) and nothing to lose, because the transaction would surely
be taxable if the assets were simply transferred to the acquiring corpo-
ration in exchange for its stock.43
Genesis of the 80 Percent Control Test for
Corporate Contributions
The genesis of both the section 351 (a) nonrecognition rule and the
section 368(c) definition of control was section 202(c)(3) of the
Revenue Act of 1921.11 The legislative purpose of section 202(c) (3)
appears to have been to facilitate business readjustments, and at the
same time prevent erosion of the fisc by the generation of colorable
losses.4" Congress thought it was economically unsound " to treat a
contribution to a corporation as a taxable event where the shareholder
either had control or was a member of a control group. Section
11 The incorporation followed by reorganization procedure outlined above points
up another fallacy in the operation of the 80 percent test. Why should it be pos-
sible for General Motors to acquire the stock of the Mom and Pop Corner Grocery
Store, Inc. in exchange for voting stock of G.M. and have the transaction treated
as a nontaxable reorganization, whereas if G.M. acquired the partnership interests
of the Mom and Pop Corner Grocery Store Partnership in exchange for voting
stock, the exchange would be taxable? Of course, the 80 percent test as it applies
to section 351 is not to be blamed, because it operates to insure that the second
transaction is taxed in accordance with its economic substance. The problem lies
with the reorganization provisions, for they operate to treat the first transaction in
a manner that is truly alien to common sense. The tax impact of such transactions
should not be based on the fortuitous choice of business form by Mom and Pop.
Although the 80 percent test operates to produce a sound result in the second
transaction, it nevertheless operates inequitably in view of the nonrecognition treat-
ment available for the first by reason of the reorganization provisions. But for
this short digression, the 80 percent control requirement of section 351 is viewed
without respect to the operation of the reorganization provisions which are beyond
the scope of this article. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE at Ch. 14.
11 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (3), 42 Stat. 227 (now section 351(a)
of 1954 Code).
4 These purposes were indicated in the following passage from the Senate re-
port: "The ... amendments .. will, by removing a source of grave uncertainty
and by eliminating many technical constructions which are economically unsound,
not only permit business to go forward with the readjustments required by existing
conditions but also will considerably increase the revenue by preventing taxpayers
from taking colorable losses in wash sales and other fictitious exchanges." S. REP.
No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1921). The same statement also appears
in the House report. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1921).
4o Ibid.
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202(c) (3) also treated as nonrecognition events like kind exchanges,
4
7
reorganizations 4s and other exchanges in which the property received
did not have a readily realizable market value. The purposes of these
additional exceptions to the general rule of recognition appear to have
been the same as those for contributions to controlled corporations.
The exception for exchanges involving property without a readily
realizable market value would seem to have been applicable to contri-
butions to corporations in exchange for stock amounting to less than
control as long as the stock was without a readily realizable market
value. Therefore, the Revenue Act of 1921 provided two exceptions to
recognition treatment for contributions to corporations. The market
value exception, however, was removed in the 1924 Act , in order to
add more definiteness to the nonrecognition provisions.50
None of the reports to the 1921 Act explain the reason for the 80
percent control test. Possibly it was a reaction to an unsuccessful
attempt to include in the Revenue Act of 1918 3 a nonrecognition pro-
vision for contributions to corporations without regard to the amount
of stock received. The Senate Committee on Finance inserted in the
House bill, which became the Revenue Act of 1918, a provision which
gave nonrecognition treatment to the following two types of trans-
actions:
[W]hen in connection with the reorganization, or consolidation of a cor-
poration a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him
new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value,
[W]hen a person receives in place of property stock of a corporation
formed to take over such property ....
The House receded to an amendment striking the provision relating
to the organization of corporations but the reorganization, merger and
consolidation provision was retained.' Thus, reorganizations were
4-Section 1031 of the Code provides for nonrecognition treatment on certain
like kind exchanges.
48The reorganization provisions of the Code are contained in sections 354
through 383.
19 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(a), 43 Stat. 253.
5OThe House report said: "It appears best to provide generally that gain or
loss is recognized from all exchanges and then except specifically and in definite
terms those cases of exchange in which it is not desired to tax the gain or allow
the loss. This results in definiteness and accuracy and enables a taxpayer to deter-
mine prior to the consummation of a given transaction the tax liability that will
result therefrom." H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924).
5'Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
.5
2 S. RFP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6 (1918).
53 H.R. REP. No. 1097, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 44-45 (1919).
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accorded nonrecognition treatment by the Congress before such treat-
ment was accorded to contributors to corporations.
In the absence of any specific legislative statement of the purpose of
the 80 percent control test, one is left to pure conjecture as to why 80
percent was chosen as the benchmark. Possibly it was a compromise
between those who favored blanket nonrecognition treatment and those
who favored blanket recognition treatment. At any course, the under-
lying theory of section 351 (a) is that there is an inherent difference
between (1) a transfer of property to an enterprise in exchange for an
ownership interest and (2) an exchange transaction between two un-
related parties in which the transferor loses control over the asset trans-
ferred. In the words of Judge Magruder in Portland Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner,54 a case involving the predecessor of section 351:
It is the purpose of [section 3511 to save the taxpayer from an immediate
recognition of a gain, or to intermit the claim of a loss, in certain transac-
tions where gain or loss may have accrued in a constitutional sense, but
where in a popular and economic sense there has been a mere change in
the form of ownership and the taxpayer has not really "cashed-in" on the
theoretical gain or closed out a losing venture .... "The transaction
described in the statute lacks a distinguishing characteristic of a sale, in
that, instead of the transaction having the effect of terminating or extin-
guishing the beneficial interests of the transferors in the transferred prop-
erty, after the consummation of the transaction the transferors continue to
be beneficially interested in the transferred property and have dominion over
it by virtue of their control of the new corporate owner of it." 5
Contribution transactions may be more like "changes in form and
not in substance, and consequently should not be considered as affect-
ing a [recognition] of income at the time of the exchange." 51 In such
exchanges the investor, in effect, retains a continuing interest in the
property transferred equal to his percentage of the outstanding owner-
ship interests. If the continuing interest is significant, the contribution
transaction is neither "a pure sale [nor] an exchange . . . amount[ing]
to a pure sale." -5
The degree of difference between a contribution to an enterprise in
exchange for an ownership interest and an exchange amounting to a
pure sale varies inversely with the percentage of ownership interest re-
ceived. A contribution of property in exchange for a 1 percent owner-
4 109 F.2d 479 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
.. 109 F.2d at 488 (quoting American Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender,
70 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1934)).
46'H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1924). The statement
refers to the theory of the substituted basis rule which is now reflected in sec-
tion 358.
5 Ibid.
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ship interest more nearly resembles a pure sale than does a contribu-
tion in exchange for a 90 percent ownership interest. Undoubtedly the
rationale of the 80 percent control test is bottomed on a desire to give
recognition treatment to those contribution transactions which are pure
sales, such as contributions of property to an ongoing publicly held
corporation in exchange for marketable stock amounting to only a small
fraction of the corporation's outstanding stock. Certainly the 80
percent control test avoids nonrecognition treatment for some ex-
changes which are tantamount to pure sales, but it also gives rise to
recognition treatment for some exchanges which are not pure sales.
On the formation of a corporation a 1 percent investor will receive
nonrecognition treatment because he is a member of the control group,
whereas a new 79 percent investor in an operating corporation will not
receive nonrecognition treatment. This is so notwithstanding the fact
that the transaction involving the 1 percent shareholder clearly more
nearly resembles a pure sale. Further, assume that a new shareholder
will be contributing to an operating corporation a building with a fair
market value of $100K and an adjusted basis of $50K. If he receives
only 1 percent of the stock, the transaction resembles a pure sale and
the 80 percent test operates in accordance with economic reality by
treating it as such. On the other hand, if he receives 79 percent of
the stock the transaction more nearly resembles a change in form of
ownership rather than a pure sale, but the 80 percent test operates to
treat the transaction as though it were a pure sale. If the property con-
tributed had an adjusted basis in excess of its fair market value, the
loss would be recognized in the case of the receipt of 1 percent of the
stock, but by reason of the operation of section 267 would not be
recognized in the case of the receipt of 79 percent of the stock. Sec-
tion 267 disallows, inter alia, losses on otherwise taxable transactions
between an individual shareholder and a "corporation more than 50
percent in value of the outstanding stock of which is owned directly
or indirectly by or for such [shareholder]" and certain related parties.
On the loss side, therefore, section 267 in effect lowers the 80 percent
control test to more than 50 percent." Although the legislative history
5 Section 267 can operate in some cases to lower the 80 percent control re-
quirement to a mere nominal amount of stock. This is so because of the attribu-
tion rules of section 267(c), which provide, inter alia, that a shareholder is
deemed to own the stock owned by certain members of his family. Thus, if a
father contributes loss property to an operating corporation in exchange for I
percent of the stock, and his son owns the balance of the stock, the transaction
would be taxable under section 351 because of the 80 percent control test, but
the loss would not be recognized because of the operation of section 267. Unlike
section 267 the 80 percent control test of section 368(c) does not have an attribu-
tion provision.
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of section 267 does not indicate specifically why 50 percent was
chosen,"a the section is a legislative judgment that with respect to con-
tributions of loss property in exchange for stock the breakpoint be-
tween a pure sale and a mere change in form is much lower than in
the case of a contribution of gain property.
Genesis of the Partnership Contribution
Provision
As is the case with the 80 percent control test for corporations, one
is at a loss in attempting to ascertain a sound rationale for the total
absence of any type of control requirement for contributions to part-
nerships. The nonrecognition rule in section 721 was first enacted in
1954. The House and Senate reports indicate, however, that section
721 was a mere codification of existing law.' The law as it existed
at the time of the enactment of section 721 was that a contribution to
a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest was not a realiza-
tion event. This nonrealization concept seems to have originated in a
1920 opinion of the Solicitor of Internal Revenue.' In that opinion
he held, inter alia, that contribution of property by a partner to a part-
nership in exchange for a partnership interest was not a realization
event. He reasoned that to hold otherwise "would be to hold that [a]
partner could make a profit by selling to himself." I The holding was
grounded on the common-law concept that a partnership was an
aggregate and not an entity.
In Edward B. Archbald,' a 1933 case, the Commissioner attempted
to reverse this position that a contribution to a partnership in ex-
change for a partnership interest was not a realization event (at least
so far as it applied to the particular facts). There the taxpayer part-
ners had contributed appreciated property to a partnership which
59H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1937).
6 S. REP. No. 1635, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 388 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A227 (1954). The expressed congressional intent that the
purpose of section 721 was to codify the previous law is technically inconsistent
with the operation of that section. Section 721 provides an exception to the gen-
eral rule of recognition of section 1002 which is operative only in a case where
there is a realization event under section 1001. Since, as is indicated in the im-
mediately succeeding text, the previous law was that such transactions were not
realization events there would seem to be no logical reason to provide an excep-
tion to the general rule of recognition. However, one possible explanation might
be that prior to 1954 partnerships were considered aggregates, whereas under the
1954 Code they are entities for certain purposes and aggregates for others.
1 S.O. 42, 3 C.B. 61 (1920).
62 3 C.B. at 64.
6327 B.T.A. 837 (1933), nonacq., af'd, 70 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 594 (1934).
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sold the property for amounts either equal to or greater than the value
at the time of contribution. The Commissioner's primary contention
was that the partnership's basis for computing gain should be a carry-
over basis as is presently the rule under section 723 and that the pre-
contribution gain should be allocated ratably to the contributing part-
ners. In the alternative the Commissioner argued that "if the partner-
ship is so far an entity as to be a barrier to the use of the individual
contributor's earlier cost basis [i.e., carryover basis], then the contri-
bution by the individual to the partnership must be . . . 'a closed
transaction,' . . . and that such 'closed transaction' involves a reali-
zation to the individual of the gain." 4 The taxpayers argued for a
basis equal to the fair market value at the time of contribution.
The Tax Court held for the taxpayers, reasoning, inter alia, that they
would be taxed on the precontribution gain at the time the partnership
was liquidated.6 The court also reasoned that for purposes of de-
termining the amount of a partnership's taxable income, the partner-
ship was to be viewed 'as an entity. The partners would not, therefore,
be deemed to have a realization of precontribution gain at the time the
partnership disposed of the property. With respect to the Commis-
sioner's closed transaction theory, the court reasoned that "[s]ince a part-
nership stands ambiguously before the law in other fields, it is not dis-
turbing that it should be found so under the income tax statute," O par-
ticularly in view of the 1920 Solicitor's Opinion which in effect found
the partnership to be an aggregate for contribution purposes and an
entity for basis purposes. The court also gave its view of the correctness
of the Solicitor's Opinion:
But if we felt entirely at liberty to consider the contention apart from
its history [i.e., the 1920 Solicitor's Opinion], we would find it unconvinc-
ing. That the contribution of individual property to a newly organized
partnership operates to shift its title from the individual and to change the
nature of his interest is clear. But it does not follow that such change is
itself the realization of gain or loss. On the contrary, the investment is
now more fettered than before, as it is bound with others in the joint enter-
27 B.T.A. at 843.
The court was not convinced of the merit of the Commissioner's observation
that because of the stepped-up basis at death the precontribution gain would es-
cape taxation if the partners died before the partnership was liquidated. To this
argument the court responded: "The suggestion that the increment may go un-
taxed in the event the partner dies before such realization, is not sufficient to
deflect the rule, for to a similar extent the death of an individual owner likewise
defeats a tax upon increment which has not theretofore been realized. There has
been no inclination thus far to enact either an obituary toll by treating death as a
realization of income or to impose a preventive substitute." 27 B.T.A. at 843.
61 Id. at 844.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
TAX LAW REVIEW
prise. Although a transformation in title has occurred, there has been no
exchange of property for other and different property, but only a further
venturing of the old investment in a new project with the hope of added
income in the future.
7
In further support of its nonrealization event rationale, the Arch-
bald court distinguished partnership interests from corporate shares
on the grounds that the transfer of a partnership interest would de-
stroy the partnership, whereas a transfer of a share of stock would
not destroy a corporation. Apparently the court thought that because
of the inherent restrictions on the alienability of partnership interests,
a contribution of property in exchange for a partnership interest would
not constitute a realization event. It is questionable whether the dis-
tinction is meaningful.
Helvering v. Walbridge," a 1934 case, involved facts analogous to
those in Archbald. A partner contributed appreciated securities to a
brokerage partnership. The partnership sold the securities for a price
in excess of the value at the time of contribution. The partners re-
ported only the postcontribution appreciation. The Commissioner, as
he did in Archbald, argued in the alternative that (1) the contribu-
tion transaction was a realization event or (2) the gain on sale of the
contributed securities should be calculated from a carryover basis with
the difference between the carryover basis and the value at the time of
contribution attributed directly to the contributing partner. Judge
Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, rejected the Commis-
sioner's arguments.
On the first point the court reasoned that the contribution transac-
tion was not a realization event because the partnership interest re-
ceived did not have a fair market value: "In the case at bar Wal-
bridge's share in this firm, engaged in marketing securities, was not
'marketable'; the assumption is wholly unfounded that it was worth
the value of his contribution." 60 The court went on to say that al-
though under the New York partnership law a sale of a partnership
interest would not disrupt the firm, an assignee would only have a right
to an accounting. The court said that here there were "no known
buyers, nor any but imaginary demand" for such "a unique right of
action." o The opinion would seem to have left open the possibility of
certain contribution transactions being treated as realization events.
For instance, if the facts showed that a partnership interest received
61 Ibid. (citations omitted).
-3 70 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 594 (1934).
6 70 F.2d at 684.
70Id. at 685.
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was marketable, it would not appear inconsistent with W~albridge to
treat the transaction as a realization event under the Commissioner's
closed transaction theory. But the reasoning appears faulty because
the points made about the partnership interest received in Walbridge
are equally true about stock received on the formation of a closely held
corporation. The latter transactions have always been treated as
realization events, and presumably the Philadelphia Park " presump-
tion that in an arm's length transaction the value of what is received
is equal to the value of the property exchanged would operate to pro-
vide a value for the ownership interest received.
The 1920 Solicitor's Opinion and the rejection of the Commis-
sioner's closed transaction theory in Archbald and Walbridge appear
to be grounded on the absence of a pure exchange transaction. Since
the partner retains an interest in the property contributed by reason of
his partnership interest, no exchange amounting to a pure sale has
taken place.7" There is no realization event. Since the transaction is
not a realization event there is no need to search for an exception to
the general rule that all realized gain shall be recognized. This con-
ceptual treatment of contributions to partnerships is inherently differ-
ent from the treatment for contributions to corporations. As indicated
above, not until the Revenue Act of 1921 were some corporate contri-
butions statutorily excepted from the general rule of recognition.
Without regard to whether a contribution transaction is treated as a
nonrealization event or a statutory exception to the recognition rule, it
is indeed logical to provide nonrecognition treatment in cases where
the contributing partner receives a substantial partnership interest.
Such were the facts in each of the Solicitor's Opinion, Archbald and
Walbridge. But the important question is: How far can nonrecogni-
tion treatment be logically extended? Should it also apply to a transfer
of property to a publicly held limited partnership which is listed on
the New York Stock Exchange in exchange for a 1 percent limited
partnership interest? If the Solicitor's Opinion, Archbald or Walbridge
had dealt with such a situation, it is likely that the exchange would
have been found to be a realization event under the Commissioner's
closed transaction theory. In all probability an unarticulated aspect
of each of these decisions is the requirement of a substantial continu-
ing proprietary interest in the partnership. Not facing a close case,
neither the courts in Archbald and Walbridge, nor the Solicitor of
Internal Revenue in his 1920 Opinion considered the breakpoint be-
' 1Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct.
Cl. 1954).
72H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 16-17 (1924).
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tween a substantial proprietary interest and a mere nominal proprie-
tary interest. They did not come to grips with the question of when a
contribution to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest
more nearly resembles a pure sale than a mere change in form of
ownership.
There is no sound rationale for distinguishing partnership interests
from shares of stock with respect to the question of whether a realiza-
tion event has occurred. In the case of small closely held enterprises
it is likely that the ownership interests will be unmarketable without
regard to whether the enterprise is a partnership or corporation. The
ownership interests of both closely held corporations and closely held
partnerships are likely to be subject to restrictions set out in a buy-sell
agreement. Under the Uniform Partnership Act the transfer of a part-
nership interest will not itself dissolve the partnership,73 although the
transferee's rights are in essence limited to sharing the profits attribu-
table to the partnership interest acquired.74 A corporate buy-sell agree-
ment may have the same effect. Under the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act, a limited partner's interest is assignable,75 and if the other
partners agree, the assignee can become a substituted limited partner
with all the rights of the assignor limited partner.70 Consequently,
without regard to the previous state of the law of partnerships, presently
an assignment of a partnership interest will not dissolve the part-
nership.
At the time of each of the decisions in the Solicitor's Opinion, Arch-
bald and Walbridge, there were probably no publicly held partnerships
as there are today. At the time of the codification of the nonrecogni-
tion rule in 1954 with the enactment of section 721, there were prob-
ably few, if any, publicly held limited partnerships. The publicly held
limited partnership did not become common until after the enactment
of the 1954 Code."' Even today, however, the overwhelming number
of partnerships have only a handful of partners. Consequently, there
73 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27.
,4 Ibid.
71 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 19.
76 Ibid.
77 See WILLIS at 21.
7' The Business Income Statistics of the Internal Revenue Service for 1968
indicates that in 1968 the average number of partners per partnership was just
over three. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PRELIMINARY;
STATISTICS OF INCOME 1968; BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURNS 24 (1970). Also,
Schedule M of the Partnership Return Form 1065 has space for a maximum of
four partners, an indication of the usual small number of partners in a partner-
ship. Of course, if there are more than four partners a supplement to Schedule M
must be attached.
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will probably be few instances in which contributions of property to
a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest will resemble a
pure sale. In the normal case, therefore, the operation of section 721
is in accordance with economic reality, nevertheless, in certain cases
it may operate inconsistently with a rational tax policy.
Search for a Rational Policy-
Policy Implications of Control Requirement
It is unsound from a tax policy standpoint for all contributions to
partnerships in exchange for partnership interests to be given non-
recognition treatment while only a limited number of contributions to
corporations in exchange for stock or securities are given nonrecogni-
tion treatment. There is no economic difference between contribu-
tions to the two types of enterprises, therefore, contribution transac-
tions should be treated the same without respect to the nature of the
enterprise. Since the investor group on an initial organization ex-
change ends up with 100 percent of the ownership interests, there is no
difference in the treatment with respect to an initial organization ex-
change, because section 351 with its 80 percent control group test is
analogous to the treatment under section 721. Different treatment can
occur, however, in the case of contributions to operating enterprises.
A transfer to an operating partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest will not give rise to recognition, whereas a transfer to an
operating corporation in exchange for stock or securities may give rise
to recognition.
The strongest policy reason for giving either transaction nonrecog-
nition treatment would seem to be the facilitation of business develop-
ment through the attraction of additional capitalY A second reason
is that, in general, there could be no sound policy justification for tax-
ing exchanges which are mere changes in form of ownership. Set off
against these rationales is the desirability of treating exchanges which
resemble pure sales as taxable. In the partnership area, the legislative
judgment appears to have been that no contribution of property in
exchange for a partnership interest resembles a pure sale. In the cor-
11 Prior to the Revenue Act of 1921 all transfers of property to corporations
were treated as both realization and recognition events. Section 203(c) of the
1921 Act gave nonrecognition treatment to such transfers where the transferors
had 80 percent control. Notwithstanding this nonrecognition treatment, such
transfers are still realization events.
, The Archbald court gave this as a reason for nonrealization treatment for
contributions to partnerships (27 B.T.A. at 844); and the Senate and House re-
ports to the 1921 Act gave this as one of the reasons for the enactment of the
predecessor of section 351.
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porate area, the tension between the two policies is resolved by the
legislative judgment that contributions in which less than 80 percent
control is received more nearly resemble pure sales than mere changes
in form of ownership. Such transactions will, therefore, be treated as
taxable."' The 80 percent control test for corporations and the com-
plete absence of a control test for partnerships can produce illogical
results. A contribution of property to an operating partnership in
exchange for a 1 percent partnership interest will not produce recog-
nition, but a contribution of property to an operating corporation in
exchange for 79 percent of the stock in the case of gain property or
50 percent of the stock in the case of loss property I- will produce
recognition. A contribution to a partnership in exchange for a 1 per-
cent partnership interest obviously resembles a pure sale, and, more
importantly, a contribution to a corporation in exchange for 79 per-
cent of the stock is clearly the type of transaction which both (1) will
facilitate business development and (2) resembles an exchange which
is a mere change in form of ownership.
Since the 80 percent control requirement can lead to absurd results
but at the same time may be easily circumvented with creative tax plan-
ning, what meaningful purpose does it serve? Is it not just a trap for the
uninformed? On the other hand, cannot the blanket nonrecognition
treatment for any and all contributions to partnerships operate to treat
transactions which are in economic substance sales as nonrecognition
events? There is, however, logic and illogic in both rules. The prob-
lem from a tax policy standpoint is to attempt to eliminate the ab-
surdities which are alien to both common sense and economic reality
and to design a simple and logical scheme that would be equally appli-
cable to partnerships and corporations. This can be done by distin-
guishing those contributions of property to an enterprise which more
nearly resemble pure sales from those which more nearly resemble
mere changes in form of ownership. One of the bases for the distinc-
tion should be whether the transaction is likely to have such a signifi-
cant impact on business development so as to be facilitated by exemp-
81 Section 267 is an exception to this judgment in the case of a contribution of
loss property.
82 Transactions in which a shareholder receives less than control are not pro-
tected by section 351 and, therefore, recognition would prevail. In cases where
the stock ownership is greater than 50 percent but less than 80 percent, section
267 would operate to treat a contribution of loss property as a nonrecognition
event. Consequently, on a contribution of loss property for stock amounting to
more than 50 percent but less than 80 percent, the transaction is treated as a sale
for purposes of section 351, but is treated as a nonrecognition event by section
267. Section 267 is designed to prevent the creation of artificial loss deductions.
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tion from the general rule of recognition. In making the distinction
it is desirable to treat separately three types of transactions:
(1) The organization of a new enterprise.
(2) A contribution by a group of investors to an operating en-
terprise of a massive amount of capital as measured by the value of
the outstanding stock received for the property contributed.
(3) A contribution by a single investor to an operating enter-
prise of a substantial amount of capital as measured by the value of
the outstanding stock received for the property contributed.
These three transactions should be considered separately because each
presents different factors which should be considered in determining
whether nonrecognition treatment should be accorded to a contribution.
Organization of a New Enterprise
The coming together of a diverse group of investors to organize a
single business venture is important to the development of business
enterprises. Also, such transactions do not, in general, resemble pure
exchanges. Although in the case of the 1 percent investor the organi-
zation transaction may not resemble a mere change in form of owner-
ship, because the organization of new business enterprises is of such
importance, it would not be wise to treat such transactions as recogni-
tion events for any of the members of the initial investment group. A
denial of nonrecognition treatment to some (or possibly all) members
of the organization group could certainly deter the organization of new
business enterprises. Consequently, on the organization of a new en-
terprise all of the initial investors should be given nonrecognition treat-
ment for their contributions of property in exchange for ownership in-
terests. Under the current state of the law with respect to the forma-
tion of partnerships and corporations, all of the investors in an organi-
zation group receive nonrecognition treatment and this treatment
should be continued.
Contribution of a lasssive Amount of
Capital by a Group of Investors to an
Operating Enterprise
A contribution of a massive amount of new capital to an operating
enterprise by a group of investors should be given nonrecognition
treatment for the same reasons which support nonrecognition on an
initial organization. Such contributions are an indicia of a revitaliza-
tion of an ongoing venture and do not resemble pure exchange trans-
actions. Consequently, they should be given nonrecognition treatment.
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The test of whether a contribution is massive should be determined by
reference to the value of the ownership interest received in exchange
for the property contributed relative to the value of the outstanding
ownership interests immediately after the contribution. In order to
consider the contributions of all members of the new investor group
the basic control group concept for contributions to corporations would
have to be used, but control would be measured solely by reference to
the percentage of ownership interests received as a result of the contri-
bution of the property. To include previously owned ownership in-
terests in determining whether control existed would permit nonrecog-
nition to be accorded for a small investment by a group in a case where
the group or certain members thereof owned substantial ownership in-
terests prior to the contribution.
The measurement of control by reference to the ownership interests
received by the group in respect of the property contributed would be
a clear departure from the current rule for both corporations and part-
nerships. With respect to corporations, if a group of shareholders owns
in the aggregate 80 percent of the stock of a corporation after a con-
tribution of property (without respect to the amount owned before the
contribution) nonrecognition treatment is accorded to all members of
the group. This means, for instance, that if a group of shareholders
owned 100 percent of the stock of a corporation the group would re-
ceive nonrecognition treatment on the contribution of any additional
property without respect to the value of such property. The normal
situation in which a group of present shareholders will be making addi-
tional contributions will involve proportionate contributions by all
shareholders. It may appear at first glance that such contributions
should be given nonrecognition treatment. A blanket rule of nonrecog-
nition would not be wise, however, because it would permit certain
transactions which were pure exchanges to be given nonrecognition
treatment. For instance, suppose a group of three equal shareholders
owned a corporation with a value of $10 million and that each will be
making additional contributions of a small amount of capital, say
$5K. There is no sound policy reason for permitting these share-
holders nonrecognition treatment for such minor contributions. Such
contributions would resemble pure exchange transactions, and it is
unlikely that the application of the general rule of recognition would
act as a deterrent to such contributions if, indeed, the additional capital
was needed by the enterprise. On the other hand, if the contributions
were massive (say, for instance, each shareholder would be contribut-
ing $5 million of additional capital), then nonrecognition treatment
should be accorded to the contributions because such contributions,
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in general, are essential to the business development and do not re-
semble pure exchanges. Although under the rule proposed here only
group contributions of massive amounts of capital would be given
nonrecognition treatment, the single investor can also rely on the sub-
stantial contribution provision described below.
The recognition rule for nonmassive group contributions would apply
even in cases where because of the pro rata nature of the contributions
the shareholders in the group do not take back additional ownership
interests. If additional ownership interests were not distributed, the
transaction should be considered as a constructive receipt of ownership
interests in exchange for the property contributed.
In determining the amount of ownership interest which would be
representative of a massive infusion of capital, the starting point should
be the 80 percent control test of section 368(c) which is made appli-
cable to the formation of corporations by section 351(a). The 80
percent rule is a clear legislative judgment that a contribution of prop-
erty in exchange for 80 percent of the stock of a corporation repre-
sents a massive infusion of capital. But, is 80 percent necessarily a
logical breakpoint? It would appear that the breakpoint could be
much lower, possibly 50 percent. The adoption of a 50 percent test
would mean that nonrecognition treatment would result any time a
group of investors contributed property to a corporation or partner-
ship in exchange for ownership interests representing at least 50 per-
cent control of the enterprise as determined by reference to the owner-
ship interests received in respect of the contributed property. This rule
would both broaden and narrow the nonrecognition treatment pres-
ently accorded to operating corporations and narrow the availability
of nonrecognition treatment for contributions to operating partner-
ships. A group of new investors who contribute property to an operat-
ing corporation in exchange for less than 80 percent of the stock cur-
rently receive recognition treatment. Under the proposed rule such
transactions would be given nonrecognition treatment as long as the
group received at least 50 percent of the stock, thus broadening the
corporate nonrecognition treatment. But, since the control test would
be determined by reference to the stock received in respect of the
property contributed, as opposed to the present rule of considering all
stock without respect to the amount of stock received, the corporate
"'See, e.g., section 367 and Revenue Procedure 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821, issued
under section 367. These provisions treat certain transfers of appreciated property
to controlled foreign corporations as recognition events without respect to whether
additional stock is issued by the controlled foreign corporation. This same prin-
ciple could be applied to the transaction discussed in the text.
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nonrecognition provisions would be narrowed. This narrowing, how-
ever, is constrained by the rule for contributions of substantial capital
by the single investor which is discussed immediately below.
Contribution of Substantial Capital by a
Single Investor to an Operating Enterprise
In considering contributions by a single investor, the 50 percent
rule for massive infusions of capital seems to be too high a barrier to
nonrecognition treatment. When a single investor contributes a sub-
stantial amount of new capital, as measured by the value of the out-
standing stock received in exchange for the property contributed, non-
recognition treatment should be accorded, because such transactions
do not resemble pure exchanges. Also the tax laws should not deter
substantial investments by single investors in operating ventures. It
is important to note the relationship between this substantial invest-
ment rule and the massive infusion of capital rule. The latter rule
would apply to groups of investors and the group may contain in-
vestors who individually would be making insubstantial contributions of
property. However, as long as the contributions of the group as an
aggregate represent a massive infusion of capital, which is designated to
be capital equal to 50 percent of the value of the outstanding ownership
interests of the enterprise, nonrecognition treatment results. The in-
vestor who makes an insubstantial contribution will be given recognition
treatment unless he is a member of an initial organization group or a
group which is making a massive infusion of capital.
In determining whether a contribution by a single investor is sub-
stantial, only the stock received in respect of the property contributed
should be considered. This provision would change the present rule
for both partnerships and corporations. Under the present corporate
provisions a more than 80 percent shareholder is given nonrecognition
treatment for all contributions, whether substantial or insubstantial.
For instance, under the present rules a shareholder who is the sole
owner of a corporation with a value of $10 million can contribute an
asset with a fair market value of $5K and an adjusted basis of $1K and
receive nonrecognition treatment on the contribution. Clearly the
transaction resembles a pure exchange, and further it is unlikely that
the general rule of recognition would act as a deterrent to such a con-
tribution if, indeed, the $5K asset would have a substantial impact on
the viability of the enterprise. There is an absence of a sound policy
rationale for granting nonrecognition to such transactions whether the
enterprise is a partnership or a corporation. This is so even if the
investor does not take back additional ownership interests to represent
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his additional contribution. As in the case of contributions by groups,
if the investor does not take back additional ownership interests, the
transaction should be viewed as a constructive distribution of owner-
ship interests in exchange for the property.8
The next question is what is a logical breakpoint between a sub-
stantial and insubstantial investment. Obviously the breakpoint should
be lower than the 50 percent which is suggested for massive infusions
of capital. Indeed, the denial under section 267 of loss deductions for
sales between a corporation and a greater than 50 percent share-
holder is an implicit recognition by Congress that such transactions
more readily resemble mere changes in form of ownership than pure
exchange transactions.
Possibly some insight into the question of a logical breakpoint be-
tween a substantial and insubstantial contribution can be gotten from
a look at the collapsible corporation area. The courts and the Com-
missioner have wrestled with the problem of determining what is or is
not a substantial part of a whole as the term is used in the definition
of a collapsible corporation.8 The two leading cases are Commis-
sioner v. Kelley " and Heft v. Commissioner,1 both of which were de-
cided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Kelley held that a 331S
percent realization was a substantial part. The corporation was, there-
fore, not collapsible and the taxpayer had capital gains rather than
ordinary income on the sale of his stock. Heft held that 17 percent
realization was not a substantial part. The corporation was, there-
fore, collapsible and the taxpayer had ordinary income rather than
capital gains on liquidation. The Commissioner has said he will fol-
low the Kelley decision, thus agreeing that 331/ percent is a substan-
tial part.
Although it can be misleading to analogize principles in two differ-
ent areas of the law, it would not be illogical to conclude that since
33 percent is a substantial part of a whole, a contribution to a firm
in exchange for a 331/ percent ownership interest is a substantial con-
tribution. The use of a substantial part in the collapsible corporation
8 Ibid.
8 The problem of determining what is a substantial part of a whole arises in
the collapsible corporation area under section 341. Section 341(b)(1) defines a
collapsible corporation as, inter alia, a corporation with respect to which the
shareholders intend to either liquidate or sell before the corporation has realized
a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from certain property. If a
substantial part has not been realized, a sale of the stock or liquidation may give
rise to ordinary income as opposed to capital gains.
£032 T.C. 135 (1959), acq., prior nonacq. withdrawn, Rev. Rul. 72-48, 1972-1
C.B. 102, aff d, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
87294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961), affirmning 34 T.C. 86 (1960).
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area is, however, designed as part of a prophylactic device for pre-
venting the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains, whereas
the nonrecognition provisions are designed to facilitate business ad-
justments. It would not, therefore, be illogical to consider something
less than a 331/ percent contribution as substantial. Possibly the
breakpoint should be 25 percent, a clean split between Kelley's 331/3
percent and Heft's 17 percent.
The effect of a 25 percent test for substantial contributions by a
single investor would be to measurably broaden the availability of
nonrecognition treatment for contributions to operating corporations,
except with respect to contributions by 80 percent or more stock-
holders who are currently given nonrecognition treatment without re-
spect to the amount of their contributions. The overall effect would
be to further facilitate corporate business adjustments while at the
same time putting a tighter control on the deductibility of colorable
losses."8 The rule would narrow the availability of nonrecognition
treatment for contributions to operating partnerships. This would be
a possible detriment to taxpayers in the case of a contribution of gain
property in exchange for less than a 25 percent partnership interest,
but a benefit on the contribution of loss property for less than a 25
percent partnership interest. Although it might seem harsh to give a
less than 25 percent partner recognition treatment on the contribution
of gain property to an operating partnership, there would also be a
benefit to the partnership (and derivatively to the partners, including
the contributing partner) of a higher basis for the asset contributed.""
Moreover, under the present law such a transaction would be a recog-
nition event if the firm (with the same assets and liabilities) happened
to be a corporation rather than a partnership.
In summary the following rules of nonrecognition for contributors
to enterprises are proposed:
(1) Nonrecognition treatment should continue to apply to con-
tributions to newly organized enterprises.
(2) Nonrecognition should apply to contributions of property to
operating enterprises by a group of investors in exchange for at least
8" A lowering of the 80 percent test to 25 percent would automatically lower
the section 267 control test for nonrecognition of losses from more than 50 per-
cent to 25 percent when property is contributed in exchange for stock.
" This would permit the conversion of capital gains into ordinary income in a
case where the asset contributed by the less than 25 percent partner would pro-
duce capital gains to the partner and would give the partnership a higher basis
for either depreciation or inventory. This is, however, the present result for con-
tributions to operating corporations for less than 80 percent of the stock.
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50 percent of the value of the outstanding ownership interests de-
termined as of immediately after the contribution, and only the
ownership interests received for the property contributed should be
considered in determining whether the 50 percent test is met.
(3) Nonrecognition treatment should be accorded to contribu-
tions of property to an operating enterprise by a single investor in
exchange for at least 25 percent of the value of the outstanding own-
ership interests determined as of immediately after the contribution,
and only the ownership interests received for the property contrib-
uted should be considered in determining whether the 25 percent test
is met.
These three rules of nonrecognition treatment would substantially
mitigate the illogical results under the present scheme which were
pointed out above. No longer would the 79 percent investor in an
operating corporation receive recognition treatment while a 1 percent
investor who is a member of a corporate organizing group is given
nonrecognition treatment. Although the 1 percent group investor
would still receive nonrecognition, the single investor contributing to
an operating corporation in exchange for a 25 percent or greater own-
ership interest would be given nonrecognition treatment. No longer
would the 1 percent investor in an operating partnership be given non-
recognition treatment, while (1) a 79 percent investor in an operating
corporation is given recognition treatment in the case of a contribu-
tion of gain property or (2) a 50 percent or less shareholder in an
operating corporation is given recognition treatment in the case of a
contribution of loss property. The rules would reverse the results.
The 1 percent investor in an operating partnership would receive rec-
ognition treatment. The 79 percent and 50 percent investors in an
operating corporation would receive nonrecognition treatment. The
rules will not eliminate attempts to obtain nonrecognition treatment
through creative tax planning, but they will substantially reduce the
necessity for the use of tax schemes to obtain nonrecognition treatment
in the case of contributions to operating corporations. Creative plan-
ning may permit the circumvention of the 25 percent and 50 percent
tests in order to obtain nonrecognition treatment on contributions to
either a partnership or corporation just as it permits the circumvention
of the present 80 percent test for contributions to corporations. The
creative planning schemes would be equally applicable to both part-
nerships and corporations, and, therefore, any prophylactic devices
which might become necessary could apply equally to partnerships
and corporations.
There is nothing sacrosanct about the suggested 25 percent and 50
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percent tests for nonrecognition treatment. Indeed it might even be wise
to lower the 25 percent test to 10 percent or 5 percent and the 50
percent test to 25 percent. Possibly the Treasury should undertake to
ascertain the optimum breakpoint between those contribution ex-
changes which are in effect mere changes in form and those which more
nearly resemble pure sales.
Assignment of Tax Detriment or Benefit
Comparative Analysis of Assignment of Tax
Detriment or Benefit
Outline of Problem
Introduction. This discussion is detailed and may be found rough
going, but the issues are significant and to the author's knowledge have
not been fully discussed before. A full development of the issues is
necessary for an understanding of the policy proposal. 0
If the ownership interests received by investors are based on the
relative fair market values of the property contributed to the enterprise
and the adjusted basis of some such property is different from its fair
market value, there will be a shifting or assignment of (1) tax detri-
ment in cases where the fair market value exceeds the adjusted basis
or (2) tax benefit in cases where the adjusted basis exceeds the fair
market value.
An investor who contributes property with a fair market value in
excess of the adjusted basis will be shifting (assigning) to the other
investors part of the tax liability in respect of the gain when the asset
is disposed of. Also, if the asset is depreciable, the depreciation deduc-
tion will be lower than it otherwise would be. Both the potential tax
liability and the reduced depreciation are referred to here as tax detri-
ments to the other investors. On the other hand, an investor who con-
tributes property with an adjusted basis in excess of fair market value
will be shifting (assigning) to the other investors part of the benefit of
the loss deduction to be realized on the disposition of the property.
Further, if the asset is depreciable, the depreciation will be higher than
it otherwise would be. Both the potential loss deduction and the
higher depreciation charge are tax benefits to the other investors. The
discussion here relates only to cases involving the assignment of tax
1o See generally NESS & VOGEL, TAXATION OF THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATI1ON
2-64 et seq. (1972); Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital
in the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1098 (1962); and
Baldwin, § 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and "Mid-Stream" Incorporations,
38 U. CIN. L. REV. 96 (1969).
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detriment; that is, cases where the fair market value of the property
contributed is higher than the adjusted basis. In general, the results in
the case of the assignment of tax benefit are the converse of those which
obtain in case of the assignment of tax detriment.
Traditional assignments of income similar to those in Lucas v.
Earl9 and Helvering v. Horst 92 may occur on the formation of an
enterprise. However, in all cases where the fair market value of the
property contributed exceeds the adjusted basis there is a potential for
an assignment of tax detriment without respect to whether the contri-
bution is within the traditional assignment of income doctrine.
The problem with assignments of tax detriment can be particularly
acute where there is a "midstream" contribution of assets of a going
concern, such as a sole proprietorship. This could happen if, for in-
stance, A and B formed the AB equal enterprise, and A contributed
$50K in cash and B contributed accounts receivable earned by him as
a sole proprietor with a $50K fair market value and a zero adjusted
basis. This is an example of a traditional assignment of income
scheme. Alternatively, an investor may contribute property in respect
of which he has taken a business deduction which causes the property
to have a higher fair market value than adjusted basis at the time of
contribution. This could occur where, for instance,
(1) an investor takes a depreciation deduction before contribut-
ing property to an enterprise,
(2) an investor has immediately expensed the cost of certain
assets, which are subsequently contributed to an enterprise,O or
(3) an investor has taken a deduction for an addition to a re-
serve for bad debts in respect of receivables which he subsequently
contributes to an enterprise. 4
Following are hypothetical fact situations which are used here
?1281 U.S. 111 (1930).
92311 U.S. 112 (1940).
9 This would arise if, for instance, a sole proprietor in a laundry service busi-
ness contributed to a firm laundry items which were expensed on purchase but
had a fair market value at the time of contribution. Cf. Anders v. Comm'r, 414
F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969) (holding on tax benefit
grounds that the sale of such expensed items generated taxable income unpro-
tected by the nonrecognition provisions of section 337).
9-In Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), the Supreme Court held that
a contribution of receivables to a corporation in a section 351 transaction will
not give rise to income at the investor level in the amount of the deductions for
the bad debt reserves where the stock received equalled the value of the receiv-
ables minus the reserve. The Court rejected the government's argument that the
reserve for bad debts had to be recovered on tax benefit principles.
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to illustrate the operation of various aspects of the assignment of tax
detriment. Certain operating assumptions are made in order to isolate
the tax detriment element. In the discussion there are two investors:
the contributing investor and the noncontributing investor. The con-
tributing investor contributes property with a fair market value in
excess of its adjusted basis. He is thus contributing property in respect
of which there is a potential assignment of tax detriment. The non-
contributing investor contributes property with a fair market value
equal to its adjusted basis. The tax detriment has one element in all
cases and a second element in the case of depreciable assets. The first
element is the tax liability which the noncontributing investor will
suffer (either directly or derivatively) when the asset produces taxable
income for the enterprise. This could occur either on the disposition
of the asset in a taxable transaction, or, in the case of assets such as
accounts receivables with a zero adjusted basis, on the collection of the
income by the enterprise. The second element is that the benefit to the
noncontributing investor from the enterprise's depreciation deduction
in respect of a contributing investor's property will be less than it other-
wise would have been if the adjusted basis of such property had been
equal to its fair market value. Although economic reality is likely to
diverge from the operating assumptions, the tax detriment element will
be present regardless of the economic circumstances. In all cases the
noncontributing investor would have been better off in the amount of
the tax detriment if the adjusted basis of a contributing investor's prop-
erty had been equal to its fair market value.
Example of Assignment of Tax Detriment With Respect to Property
Not Subject to an Allowance for Depreciation. Assume that A and B
form the AB equal enterprise, and A contributes $50K in cash and B
contributes nondepreciable property with a fair market value of $50K
and an adjusted basis of $25K. In the absence of an adjustment in the
bargain to take account of the disparity between the fair market value
and adjusted basis of B's property, B will be assigning to A one half
of the potential tax detriment in respect of the nonrecognized gain in
his property. In the case of either a partnership or a subchapter S cor-
poration, the assignment would be directly to A since both A and B
would be directly liable for the tax on the enterprise's gain. In the
case of a subchapter C corporation, the assignment would be directly
to the corporation since it is a taxable entity and derivatively to A
since the value of both A's and B's stock in the corporation would be
diminished by any corporate tax paid in respect of such gain.5
15 If B were the sole shareholder of the corporation to which the asset was con-
tributed he would ultimately bear the burden of the tax in respect of the property.
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Assuming the fair market value of the property remained constant,
the enterprise would have a gain recognized of $25K when it sold the
property. If the enterprise otherwise broke even, it would have $25K
of taxable income. In the case of a partnership or subchapter S cor-
poration each of A's and B's share of the taxable income would be
$12.5K.11 The tax detriment in respect of one half the gain is shifted
directly to A. In the case of a subchapter C corporation the $25K
gain would be subjected to a corporate tax, and the gain proceeds after
payment of the tax would increase the corporation's earnings and
profits. 7 Assuming that the corporate tax rate on the gain would be
30 percent,"s the tax would be $7.5K, and the after-tax gain proceeds
of $17.5K would increase the corporation's earnings and profits in
such amount.9 9 By contributing the property to the corporation B has
shifted one half of the tax detriment in respect of such property to A.
A's stock, which initially had an intrinsic value of $50K 100 at the time
of contribution, will have an intrinsic value of $46.25K after the sale
(i.e., $50K minus one half the tax, $3.75K).101 Although the gain at
the corporate level might be capital, any dividend distribution to the
extent of the earnings and profits generated by the after-tax proceeds
would be ordinary income.
The above results should be contrasted with the result which would
have obtained if B had sold the asset in his individual capacity to a
In the case of a subchapter C corporation the corporate tax would theoretically
lower the value of B's shares, and in the case of a subehapter S corporation, the
tax in respect of the gain would be borne directly by B.
9 This assumes no section 704(c) special partnership allocation. In the case
of a partnership the character of the gain would be determined at the partnership
level. I.R.C. § 702(b). In the case of a subchapter S corporation the character
of the gain would be either ordinary income or long-term capital gains. I.R.C.
§§ 1373(a), 1375(a).
"rThis built in earnings and profits at the time of contribution is referred to
as donated earnings and profits. See SURREY at 282. Section 1.312-6(b) of the
regulations requires that all items includable in gross income be included in the
computation of earnings and profits. Thus, the precontribution gain which is
realized and recognized by a corporation is required to be taken into account in
computing earnings and profits. The surplus of the corporation for state law
purposes, however, would not be increased by such gain. The surplus would be
negative as a result of the tax.
9S The corporate rate on all long-term capital gains realized for tax years begin-
ning after December 31, 1974 is 30 percent. I.R.C. § 1201(a).
" See N. 97 supra.
10D A put in $50K in cash for a one half interest in a corporation with assets
with a fair market value of $100K. The intrinsic value of his stock was S5OK.
"I' After the sale the corporation will have assets with a fair market value of
only $92.5K ($100K minus the S7.5K tax on the gain), one half of which is
attributable to A's stock.
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third party and had contributed the entire proceeds from the sale to
the enterprise. In such case, B would have been taxed on the full gain
of $25K. The character of the gain would have been determined solely
by reference to the asset in B's hands, and there would not have been
an assignment of a portion of his tax detriment. 0
Mitigation of Effects of Assignment of Tax Detriment on Taxable
Dispositions of Ownership Interest. In the case of both a partnership
and a subchapter S corporation the tax detriment shifted to the non-
contributing investor will be theoretically mitigated on the taxable
liquidation of the enterprise 103 or on the sale of the ownership inter-
ests. This would occur because the investors in partnerships and sub-
chapter S corporations would increase the adjusted basis of their own-
ership interests in an amount equal to their share of the gain realized
by the enterprise on the disposition of the asset. 4 In the. case of the
contributing investor such increase would be less than the fair market
value of his share of the enterprise's assets. Conversely, such increase
to the noncontributing investor would raise the adjusted basis of his
ownership interest above the fair market value of his share of the
enterprise's assets. Thus, other things being equal, 105 on taxable liqui-
dation or sale of their ownership interests, the contributing investor
would have a gain equal to the amount of the enterprise's gain previ-
ously shifted to the noncontributing investor, and the noncontributing
investor would have a loss in the amount of such previously shifted
gain. For example, assume that A contributes $50K in cash to an en-
terprise and B contributes property with a fair market value of $50K
and an adjusted basis of $25K. If the enterprise is either a partnership
"'Not only would there be no built in gain at the corporate level, there would
also be no built in earnings and profits in the case of a subchapter C corporation.
103 Pursuant to section 731, the liquidation of a partnership will, in general, be
treated as a taxable event only if cash (and no other property) is distributed. If
property is distributed the liquidation will, in general, be treated as a nonrecog-
nition exchange. Pursuant to section 331, the liquidation of a corporation (both
subchapters C and S) is a taxable event; however, some liquidations may be given
nonrecognition treatment pursuant to section 333, an elective provision. If the
liquidation is nontaxable there will not be an immediate mitigation of the assign-
ment of the tax detriment, but such mitigation will be deferred by way of a modi-
fied substituted basis in the property distributed. I.R.C. §§ 732(a), 334(c).
104 I.R.C. §§ 705(a) (1), 1376(a). This assumes that the enterprise otherwise
broke even.
10I "Other things being equal" here means the enterprise's assets at the time of
sale or liquidation are equal in fair market value to the assets at the time of orga-
nization. This will be the case where (1) the enterprise breaks even for all periods
between organization and liquidation or sale, (2) the economic depreciation on
all depreciable assets exactly equals the tax depreciation, (3) there is no economic
appreciation or depreciation in any of the nondepreciable assets and (4) the enter-
prise has made no distributions.
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or a subchapter S corporation, on sale of the asset contributed by B,
each of A's and B's adjusted basis for his ownership interest would be
increased by $12.5K, one half of the enterprise's gain. A's initial
substituted basis of $50K would be increased to $62.5K, and B's
initial substituted basis of $25K would be increased to $37.5K. If the
enterprise were liquidated in a taxable liquidation,"", there would be
$1 00K 107 of assets available for distribution, and A and B would each
receive $50K. A would have a $12.5K loss on the liquidation which
would compensate him for the prior incurrence of the tax detriment in
respect of the shifted gain.01 Conversely, B would have a $12.5K
gain which is the price he would pay for shifting to A the tax detriment
in respect of one half the gain.10 These same results would attach if
A or B sold his ownership interest.
A's $12.5K loss would theoretically offset the $12.5K of income he
received from the enterprise's sale of B's asset and, correlatively, B's
$12.5K gain on liquidation would theoretically put him in the same
position he would have been in had he sold the asset himself initially.
The loss or gain offset is theoretical in at least three respects. First,
the offset will more than likely be capital gains or losses whereas the
gain initially shifted may be ordinary income."" A may be receiving
the benefit of a capital loss as an offset to ordinary income and B may
have the detriment of a capital gain as the price for shifting ordinary
income to A. Second, if either A or B dies while holding the owner-
ship interest the potential offset will vanish because the basis of the
property to the decedent's beneficiary would be the fair market value
of the property. 1" Third, A is suffering the interest cost associated
with the time value of money. He pays a tax in the year the enterprise
sells the asset but does not get a loss deduction until he sells his owner-
10r.See N. 103 supra.
107 See N. 105 supra.
1'- A's adjusted basis for his ownership interest would be S62.5K and his
amount realized $50K, giving him a loss realized and recognized of S12.5K.
I.R.C. §§ 331, 731.
O'9 B's adjusted basis for his ownership interest would be S37.5K and his
amount realized $50K, giving him a gain realized and recognized of S12.5K.
I.R.C. §§ 331, 731.
110The liquidation or sale will give rise to capital gains or losses, in general.
If the contributed asset is an ordinary income item to the firm (e.g., section 1245
asset), the gain (or at least part of it) will be ordinary income. The capital gains
or losses will not offset shifted ordinary income.
"' Section 1014 requires, in general, that the basis of property acquired from
a decedent be the fair market value of such property at the time of the decedent's
death. On death A's basis in the ownership interest would be lowered from
$62.5K to S50K, and B's basis would be increased from S37.5K to S50K, thereby
forever eliminating the offset.
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ship interest or the enterprise is liquidated. Thus, on liquidation or
sale of the ownership interests of a partnership or subchapter S cor-
poration there may be a theoretical equalizing effect, although the
character of the gain or loss might differ from that of the initially shifted
income.
The results in the partnership and subchapter S area do not obtain
with subchapter C corporations. There will not be a theoretical equa-
lizing effect at the time of taxable liquidation or sale of the sharehold-
er's stock. The tax detriment shifted to the noncontributing share-
holder will not be compensated for because there is no basis increase
in his stock as is the case with partnerships and subchapter S corpora-
tions. Although, other things being equal,1 2 the noncontributing in-
vestor will receive the benefit of a loss deduction on taxable liquida-
tion or sale, the deduction will not fully compensate him for the incur-
rence of the tax detriment. The contributing shareholder will experi-
ence a double tax on his share of the gain. First, he indirectly experi-
ences his share of the corporate tax. Second, because the adjusted
basis of his stock is not increased, he will experience a tax on the gain
on taxable liquidation or sale. 1"3
The above principles can be illustrated by the following example.
Assume that A contributes $50K of cash and B contributes $50K of
property with an adjusted basis of $25K. After the subchapter C cor-
poration sells the asset contributed by B and pays the corporate tax in
respect of the gain, it would have $92.5K of assets. On taxable liqui-
dation A and B would each receive $46.25K. B would be taxed on a
gain of $21.25K, the difference between the amount realized
($46.25K) and the initial substituted basis of his stock ($25K). If
he had borne the burden of all the $7.5K corporate tax, he would
have received only $42.5K on liquidation, and he would have been
taxed on a gain of $17.5K. In any event B would bear the burden of
a double tax. One half of the corporate tax detriment, however, was
shifted to A. Whereas B's benefit from the shifting of the tax detri-
ment is an additional $3.75K on liquidation minus the tax liability in
respect thereof, A's detriment from such shifting is the receipt of
$3.75K less than he would have received had there been no shifting of
the tax detriment. That is, without any shifting, A would have re-
112 See N, 105 supra.
113 The taxable gain, other things being equal, will be one half the amount of
the taxable gain to the corporation less one half of the corporate taxes attributable
to such gain. If the firm were liquidated he would receive one half the assets,
which would have a fair market value equal to the initial fair market value minus
the corporate tax.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 3 1:
1975] IMPLICATIONS OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY 67
ceived $50K on liquidation which is the amount of capital he con-
tributed. The cost to A of the tax detriment would be somewhat miti-
gated, however, by the loss deduction which he would receive on liqui-
dation. Since A's adjusted basis in his stock is $50K and he would
receive $46.25K on liquidation (the $50K he contributed minus the
$3.75K corporate tax in respect of B's property), he would get a
$3.75K loss deduction which would partially compensate him for in-
curring the detriment of one half the corporate tax.114 The same re-
sults would obtain on sale of their ownership interests.
Assignment of Tax Detriment and Mitigation Thereof With Respect
to Depreciable Property. A second element of the tax detriment will
occur in the case where the property contributed is subject to an allow-
ance for depreciation. Returning to the facts involving the AB equal
enterprise, assume that the property B contributed had been an apart-
ment building which he had purchased ten years ago for $50K and
that he had taken straight line depreciation of $2.5K per year for each
of the ten years he had held the building before contributing it to the
enterprise. Also, assume that due to price level changes the building
had retained its original fair market value of $50K. Further, assume
that the building was a depreciable asset to the enterprise, and the
enterprise deducted $2.5K of straight line depreciation each year. If
the enterprise broke even before taking account of depreciation on B's
property, the $2.5K depreciation deduction would generate a $2.5K
net operating loss. In the case of both a partnership and a subchapter
S corporation each investor's share of such loss would be $1.25K.
When considered in isolation the depreciation deduction looks like
a clear tax benefit to both investors. In the case of A, however, there
is a tax detriment, because if B's property had had an adjusted basis
equal to the $50K fair market value, the depreciation would have been
$5K and A's share of such depreciation would have been $2.5K.
A, therefore, has suffered a tax detriment in the amount of $1.25K
of depreciation which he should have received. It may seem as
though B is also suffering a tax detriment since he too would have
received the benefit of the extra depreciation after the contribution.
However, B had already received the benefit of a total of S25K de-
preciation at the time of contribution, and in order to treat both in-
vestors equally with respect to B's contributed property, A would also
"14 This may look as if A is in his original position, but he is not. If B's property
had had an adjusted basis of $50K, A would have received S50K on liquidation
or sale because no tax would have been payable on the sale of B's assets. Con-
sequenfly, A is only partially compensated for bearing the detriment of one half
the tax attributable to B's property. Such compensation is equal to the tax savings
generated by the loss deduction.
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have to receive the full benefit of $25K of the depreciation over the
remaining life of the asset. Since the investors share equally in all re-
spects B would get the advantage of one half of the depreciation after
contribution in addition to the $25K of depreciation he received before
contribution. The $1.25K yearly extra depreciation deduction which
A should be receiving is taken by B. At the end of the 20 year useful
life period, A would have had the benefit of $12.5K in depreciation
deductions and B would have $37.5K.
In the case of a partnership or a subchapter S corporation, if there
is either a taxable liquidation or sale of the ownership interests after
depreciation is taken by the enterprise, there would be a theoretical
mitigation of the effects of the assignment of tax detriment. A and B
would be theoretically returned to the positions they would have occu-
pied had the depreciation on B's property been from an adjusted basis
of $50K. In order to illustrate the mitigation effect, assume that (1)
the rate of economic depreciation of the property contributed by B
equaled the rate of tax depreciation for such property, (2) there was
no economic appreciation or depreciation in any of the other assets and
(3) the enterprise operated at a tax loss equal to the tax depreciation
on B's property. In such case A would get a loss recognized on the
taxable liquidation or sale equal to the amount of the extra depreciation
he should have gotten ($1.25K), 115 and B would have an added gain
recognized equal to the depreciation which was diverted from A
($1.25K).
Since under the assumptions the rate of economic depreciation on
B's property equaled the rate of tax depreciation (10 percent), at the
end of the year the fair market value of such property would be $45K,
a decrease of $5K. On the other hand, the tax depreciation in respect
of such property would have only been $2.5K (10 percent of the en-
terprise's initial carryover basis).1 '6 Consequently, although B's prop-
l" This assumes that the going concern value of the enterprise is equal to the
fair market value of the enterprise's underlying assets.
116 This assumption is based on the theory that the economic depreciation in the
property will equal tax depreciation. Indeed, tax depreciation, here 10 percent
of the adjusted basis, is premised on an assumption about the economic deprecia-
tion. Since the building has an estimated useful life of ten years, a zero salvage
value and straight line depreciation is taken, the 10 percent yearly tax depreciation
assumes that the building will also economically depreciate 10 percent per year.
The economic depreciation is taken from the fair market value of the property,
which in this case is $50K, whereas, the tax depreciation is taken from the ad-
justed basis of the property pursuant to section 167, which in this case is the
carryover basis of $25K. Consequently, assuming that the percentage of economic
depreciation on B's property during the first year was equal to the percentage of
tax depreciation during such year, the building would have a fair market value of
$45K at the end of the year and an adjusted basis of $22.5K.
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erty has economically depreciated in value by $5K, the tax deprecia-
tion deduction has only allowed for a $2.5K recovery of capital." 7
The capital recovery is reflected by the $2.5K net operating loss,
$1.25K of which would be deducted by each of A and B. The fair
market value of the enterprise's capital at the end of the year would
be $95K-the original fair market value ($100K) minus the eco-
nomic depreciation on B's asset ($5K).18 On sale of their ownership
interests, A and B would each receive $47.5K. Since A would have
gotten a loss deduction of $1.25K for the taxable year by reason of the
depreciation deduction, the adjusted basis of his ownership interest
would have dropped from $50K to $48.75K. On sale he would, there-
fore, have a loss recognized of $1.25K. This $1.25K loss deduction
plus the $1.25K depreciation deduction would give A a full capital re-
covery of $2.5K (the $50K capital invested minus the $47.5K amount
realized on sale). The offset is theoretical, however.""0
B's situation is the converse of A's. B's adjusted basis for his owner-
ship interest would be reduced by $1.25K from $25K to $23.75K by
reason of the operating loss. He would receive $47.5K on sale. He
would have a gain of $23.75K, $1.25K of which would result from the
extra depreciation allowable to him. The cost to him of the additional
depreciation is an increased gain on sale, because if A's share of the
depreciation had not been allocated to him, his basis in the building
would have been $1.25K higher, but he would still have received
$47.5K on sale.
Similar (but not in all respects analogous) results obtain in a case
of a subchapter C corporation. A $2.5K depreciation deduction will
be taken by the corporation each year, thereby reducing its tax liability
(assuming a profitable corporation) in such amount. The reduction
in the tax liability will derivatively inure equally to the benefit of A
and B. Had the adjusted basis of B's property been equal to the fair
market value, however, the depreciation charge would have been
$2.5K higher; the taxable income would have been $2.5K lower; and
the tax liability (assuming a 50 percent rate) would have been $1.25K
"'The depreciation deduction is theoretically designed to prevent an erosion
of capital. It shields part of the enterprise's income from tax. If B's asset had
had a $50K adjusted basis, the S5K depreciation deduction would have shielded
$5K of income from tax, thus preserving the original capital.
" 8"This is so because the enterprise is assumed to have broken even except for
the depreciation in respect of B's property. Consequently, there is a loss to the
extent of the depreciation in respect of B's property. The economic loss is greater
than the tax loss, however, because the economic depreciation (S5K) is 10 percent
of the fair market value ($50K) whereas the tax depreciation (S2.5K) is 10 per-
cent of the adjusted basis ($25K).
11 See discussion in text accompanying Ns. 110-11 supra.
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lower. The reduced depreciation causes A to suffer a tax detriment,
because he only gets one half the benefit from the depreciation deduc-
tion he would have otherwise received had the adjusted basis of B's
property been equal to its fair market value. This is similar to the tax
detriment A suffers in the partnership and subchapter S forms. Unlike
the partnership and subchapter S cases, A will not receive a total off-
setting deduction to compensate him for the loss of the benefit of the
depreciation which the corporation would have had if the adjusted
basis of B's property had equaled the property's fair market value.
This aspect is hard to demonstrate, but a good starting point is to
assume that the subchapter C corporation's income was equal to all its
deductions with the depreciation deduction in respect of B's property
calculated on the fair market value rather than the adjusted basis.120
This will be referred to as the economic break even point, that is, the
point where the enterprise's income is sufficient to keep the enter-
prise's capital constant.12 1 In this case the enterprise's income before
taking account of the depreciation charge would be $5K and, if the
depreciation deduction was equal to the assumed economic deprecia-
tion of $5K, 122 there would be no taxable income, because the enter-
prise would break even. The depreciation deduction is only $2.5K,
however, and the enterprise would have $2.5K of taxable income.
Assuming a 50 percent tax rate, the enterprise's tax liability would be
$1.25K. This $1.25K tax liability would cause an erosion of capital
in such amount (assuming an economic depreciation equal to $5K),
because at the end of the year the enterprise would have assets with a
fair market value of $98.75K. Although the enterprise has operated
at the economic break even point, the lower tax depreciation caused
an erosion of capital. The amount of the erosion is equal to the tax
liability in respect of the taxable income. The taxable income is an
amount equal to the difference between the economic depreciation and
the tax depreciation. Since A owns one half of the ownership interests
120 This means that the depreciation charge is equal to the assumed economic
depreciation of $5K (10 percent of the $50K fair market value) instead of $2.5K
(10 percent of the $25K adjusted basis).
121 If the tax depreciation charge were based on the economic depreciation and
the firm broke even, the income would equal all the deductions, and the capital
would remain constant in the absence of other price level changes. The income
shielded from tax by the depreciation deduction would exactly compensate for
the economic depreciation of the depreciable assets. If, however, the tax depre-
ciation charge is less than the economic depreciation and the firm breaks even
from a tax standpoint, there will be an erosion of capital equal to the difference
between the economic depreciation ($5K in this case) and the tax depreciation
($2.5K in this case).
121 This is 10 percent of the fair market value of B's property.
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of the corporation, he ultimately bears the burden of one half of the
corporate tax ($.625K). If A were to sell his stock at the end of the
first year, and the stock were valued at the fair market value of the
underlying assets he would receive $49.375K, which is exactly S.625K
less than he would have received if the depreciation deduction had
equaled the economic depreciation. -
Since A's adjusted basis for his stock is $50K, he would get a loss
deduction of $.625K on sale to compensate him for the erosion of
capital. Assuming that the deduction lowers his tax liability by 30 per-
cent'" 4 of such amount, his ultimate loss from the transaction would
be $.4375K. Although the corporation has operated at the economic
break even point, A has suffered a capital erosion which he would not
have suffered had the tax depreciation on B's property been based on
an adjusted basis equal to its fair market value.
On the other hand, B benefits from the transaction. This can be
seen from the fact that he receives $49.375K on liquidation, whereas
if he had borne the full cost of the tax liability ($1.25K) incurred by
the corporation due to the disparity between economic depreciation
($5K) and tax depreciation ($2.5K), he would only have received
$48.75K on liquidation. This is so because B has gotten the advantage
of one half of the depreciation in respect of his property when all such
depreciation should have inured to the benefit of A.
Summary of Concept of Assignment of Tax Detriment. Again it
must be emphasized that the operating assumptions in each of the
above hypotheticals are designed to isolate the tax detriment element.
It is important to note, however, that without regard to the operating
assumptions the noncontributing investor will suffer a tax detriment
he would not have suffered if the adjusted basis of the contributing
investor's property had been equal to its fair market value. The tax
detriment will operate in one of the following ways in every case:
(1) The noncontributing investor will always suffer the tax detri-
ment of either a greater taxable gain or a reduced taxable loss on the
disposition of the contributing investor's property. In other words, if
the adjusted basis of the contributing partner's property had been
equal to its fair market value, the noncontributing partner's share of
mIf the tax depreciation had equaled the economic depreciation the enter-
prise's capital would have been $100K and A would have received S50K on sale
or liquidation.
14 On sale or liquidation A would normally have a capital loss. Assuming A
has capital gains equal to or greater than such losses and he is in a 30 percent
capital gain bracket, the loss deduction would save him taxes in an amount of 30
percent of the deduction.
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the gain would automatically be less and his share of loss automati-
cally greater, than in the case where the fair market value is higher
than the adjusted basis at the time of contribution. This is so because
the amount realized from the disposition of the property is a constant
figure and the gain or loss will, therefore, vary depending on the ad-
justed basis at the time of contribution. Only when the adjusted basis
is equal to the fair market value will the taxable gain or loss with
respect to such property be attributable solely to postcontribution
factors.
(2) The noncontributing investor will suffer the detriment of re-
ceiving less of the benefit from the deduction in respect of a contribut-
ing investor's property than he would have received had the adjusted
basis been equal to the fair market value at the time of contribution.
This will happen, for instance, when the contributed property is de-
preciable and, therefore, the depreciation deduction is less than it
otherwise would have been.
The two elements of tax detriment (assignment of gain and a
reduced depreciation deduction) can operate in tandem where the
enterprise holds a depreciable asset for a period and then disposes of
it. In such case the noncontributing investor suffers a double tax detri-
ment: (1) He receives less benefit from the depreciation during the
period the property is held by the enterprise and (2) he bears the
burden of taxable gain on disposition.
Prevention of Assignment of Tax
Detriment and Benefit
Partnership Provisions. The partnership provisions, unlike the sub-
chapter C and S corporate provisions, provide a mechanism for elimi-
nating the assignment of tax detriment or benefit. The partners can
elect to have the partnership agreement provide that the full amount of
the detriment or benefit in respect of contributed property with a dis-
parate fair market value and adjusted basis shall be allocated to the
contributing partner. This is provided for in section 704(c) (2):
If the partnership agreement so provides, depreciation, depletion, or
gain or loss with respect to property contributed to the partnership by a
partner shall, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate,
be shared among the partners so as to take account of the variation be-
tween the basis of the property to the partnership and its fair market value
at the time of contribution.
Section 704(c) (1) provides that if the partnership agreement is silent
with regard to such allocations, then the gain, loss, depreciation, et
cetera, will be shared as if the partnership had purchased the asset.
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Section 704(c) (1), therefore, adopts an entity approach as a general
rule, and 704(c) (2) permits the partners to elect aggregate treatment
for the income items in respect of contributed property with a dis-
parate fair market value and adjusted basis. The theory of the aggre-
gate approach of section 704(c)(2) is that any precontribution gain
or loss which the partnership subsequently recognizes will be allocated
to the contributing partner. Also, the depreciation or depletion deduc-
tion in respect of such property, to the extent thereof, will be allocated
first to the noncontributing partners in an amount equal to the deduc-
tion they would have received if the adjusted basis of the contributing
partner's property had equaled its fair market value, and any excess
will be allocated to the contributing partner.' The effect of these
allocations is to put the partners in the position they would have been
if the adjusted basis of the property contributed had equaled the fair
market value of such property. The section 704(c) (2) allocation can
be made at any time on or before the "date . . . prescribed by law
for the filing of the partnership return" for the year." '
Section 704(c) (2) was added to the partnership provisions by the
Senate Committee on Finance in its consideration of the 1954 Code.
In discussing the entity approach of section 704(c) (1), the commit-
tee said that such "treatment was adopted as the general rule in the
interest of simplification," 'I notwithstanding the possible inequity
which could accrue to the noncontributing partner. The committee
then went on to point out
While the [general rule of section 704(c) (1)1 may result in possible detri-
ment (or gain) to noncontributing partners, it should be noted that there
will, in general, be a corresponding loss (or gain) to such partners upon
sale or disposition of their interest in the partnership.121
In implementing section 704(c) (2), the regulations first provide
that the amount of gain, loss, depreciation or depletion specially allo-
cated can in no event exceed the amount of such items to the partner-
ship. This is the obvious ceiling on the allocations.
In determining the amount of gain or loss to be specially allocated
in the case of nondepreciable property, the postcontribution economic
appreciation or diminution in value must be taken into account. Both
12- If, however, the adjusted basis exceeds the fair market value, then the por-
tion of the depreciation attributable to such excess is allocated fully to the partner
who contributed the property.
'- 6Reg. § 1.761-1(c).
'zS. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379-80 (1954).
I'Md. at 380.
Ibid.
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the postcontribution economic appreciation or diminution in value
and the amount of tax depreciation must be taken into account in
determining the amount of gain or loss to be specially allocated in the
case of depreciable property.
In the case of nondepreciable property, the amount of nonrecog-
nized gain or loss at the time of contribution (precontribution gain or
loss) is the maximum amount of such gain or loss which can be specially
allocated to the contributing partner at the time the partnership disposes
of the property. In the case of gain assets, any postcontribution appre-
ciation above the fair market value at the time of contribution will be
allocated in accordance with the normal manner for sharing such
gains. Any postcontribution diminution in the value of the assets
will reduce the precontribution gain allocated to the contributing part-
ner, and if the diminution drops below the adjusted basis, the loss
would be allocated in accordance with the normal manner of sharing
such losses. These rules can be illustrated graphically as follows:
CONTRIBUTION OF GAIN ASSETS
Postcontribution Postcontribution appreciation
Appreciation in Value in value will be allocated
among the partners in the
normal manner for
$100K sharing such gain.
Fair Market Value = $1 00K FMV Precontribution gain will be
at Time of Contribution allocated to the contributing
partner. The "ceiling" on such
Adjusted Basis - $50K allocated gain is $50K.
at Time of Contribution $50K
Adjusted
Postcontribution Diminution Basis Any loss attributable to
in Value Below the postcontribution diminution in
Adjusted Basis value will be allocated among
the partners in the normal
manner for sharing
such losses.
In the case of a contribution of loss assets, any postcontribution
appreciation will reduce the amount of precontribution loss allo-
cated to the contributing partner. Any such appreciation in excess of
the adjusted basis will generate gain, and such gain will be shared in
accordance with the normal manner for sharing such gains. Any post-
contribution diminution in value will generate additional loss which
will be shared in accordance with the loss sharing ratio. These rules
can be illustrated graphically as follows:
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CONTRIBUTION OF LOSS ASSETS
Postcontribution Postcontribution gain
Appreciation in Value in allocated among the partners
Excess of Adjusted Basis in the normal manner
$100K for sharing such gains.
Adjusted
Adjusted Basis = $100K Basis Precontribution loss
at Time of Contribution allowable to the contributing
partner. The "ceiling" of such
Fair Market Value = $50K allocation is S50K.
at Time of Contribution $50K
Postcontribution FMV Any additional loss
Diminution in Value attributable to
postcontribution diminution
in value will be allocated
among the partners in the
normal manner for sharing
such losses.
The above principles apply, in general, on the sale of the depreciable
property by the partnership; however, the special allocation of the tax
depreciation must also be taken into account before determining the
allocation of such gain or loss. The following discussion is limited to
the case of a contribution of appreciated depreciable property.
A noncontributing partner "has, in effect, purchased an undivided
. . . interest" -30 in the property contributed which has a disparate
fair market value and adjusted basis. Such undivided interest is mea-
sured by the noncontributing partner's relative share of the partnership
interests. If A contributes $50K in cash to the AB equal partnership
and B contributes depreciable property with a fair market value of
$50K and adjusted basis of $25K, then A has in effect purchased a
one half interest in B's property.13 1 The adjusted basis of A's one half
interest is only $12.5K, whereas the fair market value of such interest
is $25K. Consequently, A will not get the full benefit of his deprecia-
tion on his one half interest. Under the special allocation provision of
section 704(c) (2), the partners can agree in the partnership agree-
ment to allocate B's one half share of the adjusted basis to A. Over
the remaining depreciable period of the asset A would, therefore, get
the full amount of depreciation he would have been entitled to had B
n2°Id. at 381; Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2) Ex. 1.
13'Likewise B has purchased an undivided one half interest in A's cash.
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contributed property with an adjusted basis of $50 K.13 2 It can be seen
that if the adjusted basis of B's property had been less than $25K, A
would not be able to get all the depreciation he would have otherwise
been entitled to because of the ceiling on such allocation. If, however,
B's adjusted basis was in excess of $25K, B would get the benefit of
the depreciation attributable to the portion of the basis in excess of
$25K. If B's basis was $37.5K and the asset had a useful life of ten
years, a zero salvage value and the straight line method of depreciation
was elected, there would be $3.75K of depreciation taken each year.
A would be allocated $2.5K and B, $1.25K.
Having seen how the depreciation can be allocated pursuant to sec-
tion 704(c) (2), it is now possible to consider what happens with the
special allocation of the gain or loss on the disposition of such de-
preciable property. The gain situation will be considered first. This
calls for the introduction of a new concept-an imaginary deprecia-
tion account on the fair market value of such property.'33 The pur-
pose of the imaginary depreciation account is to reflect what would
have been the depreciation had the adjusted basis of the contributed
property equaled the fair market value. The amount of gain which
would be allocated to the contributing partner is an amount equal to the
difference between (1) the fair market value of the contributed prop-
erty, minus the accumulated imaginary depreciation, and (2) the
initial carryover basis of such property, minus the partnership's ac-
cumulated tax depreciation. This difference will gradually decrease
during the depreciation period, converging to zero at the end of such
period. The ceiling on the amount of gain allocable to the contrib-
uting partner on sale by the partnership will be a floating amount,
whereas in the case of a nondepreciable gain asset the ceiling on
allocable gain is static. If the amount realized from the sale of de-
preciable property exceeds the original fair market value minus the
accumulated imaginary depreciation in respect of such property, such
excess is deemed to be attributable to postcontribution appreciation and
will be shared by the partners in accordance with the normal manner
for sharing gains. If the amount realized from sale is less than the
initial carryover basis, minus accumulated tax depreciation, such loss
will be shared by the partners in accordance with the normal manner
for sharing losses.
132 In such case A would receive the benefit of $25K depreciation over the re-
maining useful life of the asset, and B would not receive any depreciation.
113 The imaginary depreciation each year is the normal straight line rate, which
in this case is 10 percent, applied against the fair market value at the time of
contribution ($50K).
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The following hypothetical illustrates these principles. A contrib-
utes cash of $50K to the AB equal partnership, and B contributes de-
preciable property with a fair market value of $50K and adjusted basis
of $25K. The partners adopt the section 704(c) (2) method for allo-
cating depreciation and gain. B's property has a useful life of ten
years, a zero salvage value, and the straight line method of deprecia-
tion is elected. In such case the depreciation each year will be $2.5K,
all of which will be allocated to A. If the property is disposed of
after the first year, the maximum amount of gain specially allocable to
B will be an amount equal to the difference between ( 1 ) the fair market
value at the date of contribution ($50K), minus the imaginary de-
preciation ($5K); and (2) the adjusted basis at the date of contri-
bution ($25K), minus the accumulated tax depreciation ($2.5K).
The maximum gain allocable to B, therefore, would be S22.5K. If
the asset were sold for $45K, there would be a gain of $22.5K (S45K
amount realized minus $22.5K adjusted basis). The full $22.5K gain
would be allocated to B. If sold for a price in excess of $45K, $22.5K
of the gain would be allocated to B, and the excess over $45K would
be allocated equally between A and B. If sold for less than $22.5K.
the loss would be allocated equally between A and B.
These results should be compared with those which would obtain
if the asset were sold after it had been held for nine years. In such
case the maximum gain specially allocable to B would be an amount
equal to the difference between ( 1 ) the fair market value of the asset at
the time of contribution ($50K), minus the accumulated imaginary de-
preciation ($45K), and (2) the basis at the date of contribution
($25K), minus the accumulated tax depreciation ($22.5K). The maxi-
mum gain allocable to B, therefore, would be $2.5K. If the asset were
sold for $45K the gain would be $42.5K, $2.5K of which would be
specially allocated to B and $40K divided equally. If the asset were
sold after the full ten year period, there would be no specially allocated
gain because the difference between ( 1 ) the fair market value at the date
of contribution ($50K), minus the accumulated imaginary deprecia-
tion ($50K), and (2) the basis at the date of contribution ($25K),
minus the accumulated tax depreciation ($25K), would be zero.
The section 704(c) (2) allocation provision eliminates tax distor-
tions which would otherwise occur under the general rule of section
704(c) (1). Apparently, the only justification for the general rule is
its simplicity.134 Notwithstanding the purported simplicity, the general
n' S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 380 (1954).
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rule provides a statutory license for assignment of income schemes.13
One text writer flatly states that the nonrecognition treatment of section
721 "obviate[s]" the assignment of income doctrine of Lucas v. Earl
and that, consequently, a cash basis taxpayer can contribute unrealized
receivables to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest
without recognition treatment.", In the absence of a section 704(c)
(2) allocation, the transferor would then be taxed only on his distribu-
tive share of such receivables when collected. Further, the general
rule of section 704(c)(1) can operate to the disadvantage of unso-
phisticated taxpayers. 137 Indeed, the simplicity is likely to inure to
the benefit of the sophisticated and penalize the unsophisticated.
In the case of a contribution by partners of property with respect to
which they own undivided interests, section 704(c) (3) provides that
unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, the depreciation,
depletion, gain or loss with respect to such property shall be deter-
mined as though the property had not been contributed to the partner-
ship, provided the capital and profit interest correspond with the undi-
vided interests. This provision operates to prevent the assignment of
tax detriment or benefit with respect to such property unless the part-
ners provide for such assignments in the partnership agreement. Sec-
tion 704(c) (3) adopts as the general rule the aggregate approach and
gives the partners the option of electing the entity approach; its scheme
is, therefore, the reverse of the scheme of sections 704(c) (1) and
(2) .'a
Subchapter C and S Corporate Provisions. The special allocation
provision for partnerships is not available for subchapter C and S cor-
porations. Section 351 in providing for nonrecognition and sections
358 and 362 in providing for a substituted and carryover basis, statu-
torily mandate assignments of tax detriment and benefit. There is no
analogue to the special allocation provision of section 704(c) (2)
which would enable the shareholders to eliminate the assignment.
Thus, subchapter C and S corporations may be used to effect an assign-
135 If a father and son were to form an equal partnership with the father con-
tributing appreciated property and the son contributing cash and the partnership
later disposed of the appreciated asset, the father would have assigned one half
of the gain to the son. The problem would be even more acute if the property
contributed by the father was accounts receivable which had an adjusted basis
of zero.
136 WILLIS at 80.
131 If the partners in the example in N. 135 supra were unrelated, the partner
who contributed the cash would be severely penalized unless he were compensated
in some other manner for the tax detriment which he realizes.
138 A thorough discussion of section 704(c) (3) is beyond the scope of this
article. See generally WILLIS at 131-36.
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ment of unripe income of the type in Lucas v. Earl or Helvering v.
Horst, but the Commissioner may respond with an attempt to use other
statutory provisions or judicial doctrines to nullify the statutory license
for the assignment of income. In the case of the subchapter C corpora-
tion the cost of the potential double tax may be minimal compared
with the tax savings possibilities of shifting income from a share-
holder to a subchapter C corporation. For instance, if a cash basis
taxpayer who is in the 70 percent tax bracket contributes accounts
receivable (not constituting earned income within section 1348) with
a $100K fair market value and a zero adjusted basis to a wholly-owned
subchapter C corporation, the maximum tax on the accounts receiv-
able at the corporate level would be 48 percent, assuming the income
would be taxed to the corporation. This would be an immediate tax
saving of $22K ($70K minus $48K). If the shareholder later sold his
stock, he would have capital gains of $52K in respect of the contrib-
uted accounts receivable on which he would pay a tax of $15.6K. 111
The total double tax would be $63.6K, a tax saving of $6.4K. Such
transfers of unripe income are distinguishable from the normal trans-
fer of appreciated property, the gain on which will be realized and
recognized only on taxable disposition. The former will generate in-
come at some certain point in time without any further action by the
corporation other than collection of the income, whereas in the latter
case, the corporation would have to dispose of the property before the
income would be realized. The utility of the device has been somewhat
mitigated by the enactment of section 1348 which imposes a maxi-
mum tax of 50 percent on earned income. Consequently, if the un-
realized receivables in the above example would constitute earned in-
come, it would not be economically advantageous for the taxpayer to
incur the double tax by transferring them to a corporation.
In attacking the use of section 351 as a device for assignments of
income, the Commissioner might attempt to circumscribe the breadth of
the term "property" in section 351 (a). If he is successful in asserting
that the unripe income transferred is not property, then the transferor
would receive immediate recognition in the amount of the stock or
securities received in exchange therefor.14° Also, the Commissioner
might attempt to use the clear reflection of income provision of sec-
tion 446(b) to tax income collected by the corporation to the trans-
139 This assumes that the corporation is not collapsible (see section 341) and
that the capital gains would be taxed at a rate of 30 percent. See I.R.C.
§ 1201(a).
140 See Br1TER & EUSTICE at 3-58.
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feror shareholder.14' Section 482 might be used to reallocate items
between the corporation and shareholders. 42 As an alternative to
these statutory provisions, the Commissioner might attempt to use the
judicial doctrines of assignment of income, tax benefit, business pur-
pose or step transaction in order to reallocate items between share-
holders and corporations. 43 Each of these statutory provisions and
judicial doctrines is designed to deal with problems caused by the dis-
parity between the fair market value and the adjusted basis of prop-
erty contributed to corporations in exchange for ownership interests.
Adjustments in Business Bargain as a Way of Compensating for the
Assignment of Tax Detriment. The assignment of tax detriment can
be mitigated for each of the three forms by adjusting the business bar-
gain. An estimate of the tax cost in respect of contributed property
can be taken into account in valuing the property for purposes of de-
termining the amount of each investor's capital contribution."4  For
instance, the contributing investor's property might be valued at less
than its actual fair market value for purposes of determining the
amount of ownership interest he will receive in exchange for this prop-
erty. The discount from the actual fair market value should equal the
present value of the expected tax detriment the noncontributing in-
vestor will suffer in respect of such property. Alternatively, a com-
pensating security interest or other ownership interest, such as preferred
stock or a limited partnership interest, could be given to the noncon-
tributing investors to compensate them for the expected tax detriment.
In the above AB example, A and B might agree that the tax detriment
which A will suffer in respect of B's property has a present value of
X dollars. A could then be compensated for the tax detriment by re-
ceiving a greater percentage of the ownership interests equal to X
dollars, or alternatively, securities or preferred stock or a limited part-
nership interest in the amount of X dollars. The latter method would
not upset the equal ownership of the enterprise's principal equity. The
preferred stock option is only available in the case of subchapter C
corporations, because there is a statutory prohibition against more
than one class of stock in a subchapter S corporation.'4 5 If securities
"I' Id. at 3-59.
142 Ibid.
143 Id. at 3-59 to 3-62.
144 For a discussion of this method with respect to partnerships, see WILLIS at
125. See generally Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in
the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1098 (1962).
145 I.R.C. § 1371(a)(4).
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are distributed to compensate A there will, in general, be nonrecogni-
tion treatment to A140
Another option is to have the owner of the property with a disparate
fair market value and adjusted basis sell it to the enterprise. 4, There
is, however, a complex of statutory provisions which must be nego-
tiated in structuring sales of property to enterprises.148 The property
may be sold, alternatively, to other investors who could contribute the
property to the enterprise with the selling investor contributing the
cash.149 This type of transaction may raise problems with the step
transaction doctrine.' Another option is to lease the property to the
enterprise with the lease payments equaling the depreciation calculated
on the fair market value of the property rather than its adjusted basis.'
Finally, the property could be sold to a third party with the investor
contributing the proceeds.
None of these methods, however, comports more with economic
reality than does the section 704(c) (2) allocation available to the
partnership form. There are inherent frailties in attempting to set a
dollar value on the tax cost or benefit in respect of contributed prop-
erty because of the uncertainty of future tax payments. A sale to the
enterprise or other investor, or a lease transaction would each be
merely a back handed manner of accomplishing what can be accom-
plished more directly by the section 704(c) (2) partnership allocation
provision. The only instance in which the section 704(c) (2) alloca-
tion will not completely eliminate the tax distortion in respect of con-
tributed property is when the property is depreciable and the adjusted
basis is less than the amount of depreciation which would have been
146 See discussion in text accompanying N. 36 supra.
147 For a brief discussion of this method with respect to partnerships, See WILLIS
at 121.
'14 Sales of property to enterprises are beyond the scope of this article.
" In the partnership area the sale may be of an undivided interest in the prop-
erty equal to the noncontributing partners' relative shares of the partnership inter-
ests. Pursuant to section 704(c) (3), the gain, loss, depletion, and depreciation
with respect to contributed property in which the partners hold undivided interests
will be determined as if such property had not been contributed to the firm, unless
the partnership agreement provides otherwise. See WILLIS at 122 and the text
accompanying N. 138 supra.
159 The sale may be considered a mere transitory step in the transaction and,
therefore, be ignored. In such case the transaction would be viewed as though the
selling investor had contributed the property directly and the purchasing investors
had contributed the cash.
"I For a discussion of this method with respect to partnerships, see WILLIS at
123. With respect to corporations, see NEsS & VOGEL, TAXATION Or THE CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATION 2-64 to 2-65 (1972).
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allocable to the noncontributing investor if the fair market value and
adjusted basis had not been disparate.
152
Tax Policy Implications of Assignment of
Tax Detriment or Benefit
Tax Policy Issue
The tax policy issue is whether there should be mandatory provi-
sions which guard against the assignment of tax detriment or benefit
on the contribution of appreciated or depreciated property to each of
the three forms. Such prophylactic provisions would benefit the Trea-
sury to the extent they prevented the reduction of taxes by the assign-
ment (deliberate or not) of (1) tax detriment to lower bracket tax-
payers or (2) tax benefit to higher bracket taxpayers. Also, such anti-
assignment provisions would eliminate the use of business forms as
vehicles for traditional assignment of income schemes. Even more
importantly, such provisions would infuse a greater degree of equity
into the tax structure by protecting unsophisticated investors from
incurring hidden taxes. Balanced against these benefits is the addi-
tional complexity such provisions would generate.
The additional complexity may be illusory, however. There can be
no doubt that both (1) the general rule of section 704(a) of the part-
nership provisions and (2) the structure of subchapters C and S create
a potential for the assignment of tax detriment or benefit on the contri-
bution of property with a disparate adjusted basis and fair market
value. This means that in the absence of some type of adjustment to
offset the tax distortion, some investor or investors will be economi-
cally worse off and others economically better off than they would have
been had the adjusted basis of the contributed property equaled the
fair market value. In an arm's length transaction between informed
investors an adjustment in the business bargain will be made because
each party will act in his own best interest. There are at least three
instances in which there will not be an adjustment: (1) When the dis-
tortion is de minimis, (2) when the parties are unaware of the tax dis-
tortion and (3) when the parties are deliberately effecting a scheme
for the assignment of tax detriment or benefit. It follows, therefore,
that the simplicity inherent in the absence of mandatory provisions
guarding against the assignment of tax detriment or benefit is logically
sound only when the tax distortion is de minimis.
152 This will occur when, for instance, in the AB equal partnership, A con-
tributes cash of $50K and B contributes depreciable property with a fair market
value of $50K and an adjusted basis of less than $25K.
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Two questions are suggested by the tax policy issue: (I) Should the
section 704(c) (2) allocation provision be made mandatory for part-
nerships, at least in some cases, and (2) should a mandatory or elec-
five allocation provision analogous to section 704(c) (2) be extended
to subchapter C and S corporations?
Partnership Provisions
In the case of partnerships with numerous investors, it would prob-
ably be extremely burdensome to require the partners to make section
704(c) (2) allocations. Further, where numerous partners are in-
volved it is probably less likely that the tax distortions will be substan-
tial because the partners are likely to be sophisticated, and the motiva-
tions (particularly where the partners are unrelated) for assignment
of tax detriment or benefit small. Therefore, the present elective sys-
tem appears appropriate in such cases. On the other hand, it would
not be extremely burdensome to require partnerships with few part-
ners to make such allocations. It is with closely held partnerships that
the motivations for assignment of tax detriment or benefit are most
likely to be high, particularly where the partners are related and so-
phisticated.
For instance, if a father and son agreed to form an equal partner-
ship with the father contributing a building with a fair market value of
$100K and an adjusted basis of $10K and the son contributing a
building with a fair market value and adjusted basis of $100K, there
is a clear and unmitigated assignment of tax detriment from the father
to the son with respect to both depreciation and potential gain. Fur-
tier, there is an assignment of tax benefit from the son to the father
with respect to depreciation. The father will get a greater deprecia-
tion deduction (and the son a lesser) after the formation of the partner-
ship. This is a clear tax benefit to the father particularly if he is in a
higher tax bracket than the son. If the building contributed by the
father is sold, the son will be taxed on half the gain, but the firm's
capital would be shared equally. This also is a clear tax benefit to the
father.
Section 704(a) is a clear statutory license for such schemes, and it
does not appear that the Commissioner has ever challenged any such
schemes. Indeed, as long as the partnership is itself bona fide, it would
appear that section 704(a) denies the Commissioner the power to
attack such schemes notwithstanding the tax motivations of the parties.
It is also true that with respect to closely held partnerships the part-
ners are more likely to be unaware of the tax distortions, and may,
therefore, inadvertently assign tax detriment or benefit.
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A mandatory allocation provision for closely held partnerships
would, therefore, have the following effects:
(1) It would eliminate the possibility of the deliberate assignment
of tax benefit or detriment among the partners so as to reduce their
overall tax liabilities.
(2) It would protect the unsophisticated partner from suffering
hidden tax detriments.
These two effects would add a degree of equity to the tax system and
the cost in terms of simplicity would appear to be nominal.
One problem, however, is determining the partnerships to which
such a provision should apply. This should be determined by an evalu-
ation of past partnership returns in order to ascertain at what point the
problem (contributions of property with disparate fair market values
and adjusted bases) becomes less acute. One would probably find that
after the number of partners gets to be over ten the problem virtually
disappears or alternatively the investors are sophisticated. In such
cases they are likely to make other adjustments in the business bargain
or elect the section 704(c) (2) treatment.
As an alternative to a required allocation in the closely held part-
nership case, the present structure could be retained but an additional
provision could be added which would give the Commissioner au-
thority to require a section 704(c) (2) special allocation in cases
where he finds the presence of tax avoidance or evasion motivations.
Such authority could be made applicable to all partnerships, both
small and large. Such a provision would not, however, have the effect
of protecting the unsophisticated partner in a small partnership from
hidden tax detriments. It would appear, therefore, that the best course
would be to amend section 704(c) to require the section 704(c) (2)
allocations in cases where the number of partners is small, and to give
the Commissioner authority to require an allocation where the num-
ber of partners is large and there are tax avoidance or evasion mo-
tivations.
Subehapter C Provisions
In approaching the question of whether a mandatory or elective
allocation provision should be applicable to subchapter C corpora-
tions, it is helpful to set up a big firm and small firm dichotomy simi-
lar to the partnership case. In the case of the formation of a sub-
chapter C corporation by numerous shareholders, say in excess of ten,
the shareholders are likely to be sophisticated enough to take account
of the potential assignment of tax detriment or benefit. Also, the like-
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lihood of assignment of income schemes will be minimal in most such
cases particularly if the shareholders are unrelated. In the case of
closely held subchapter C corporations, the potential for the deliberate
or inadvertent assignment of tax detriment or benefit is likely to be
great. Moreover, a shareholder may not only find himself suffering
from hidden taxes by bearing the burden of an inadvertently shifted
tax detriment, but he also may find himself suffering a hidden double
tax by reason of the fact that the subchapter C corporation is a sep-
arate taxable entity. The resolution of these problems depends on the
relative merits of continuing to superimpose the corporate tax struc-
ture on precontribution income items as contrasted with a mandatory
or elective allocation provision analogous to section 704(c) (2). This
would mean that the subchapter C corporation would be treated like a
partnership with respect to precontribution income items. There would
have to be a basis provision, analogous to section 705(a), providing
for an increase or decrease in the adjusted basis of the shareholder's
stock.
In the case of the closely held subchapter C corporation, it would be
desirable to have a mandatory allocation provision for the same rea-
sons such allocations should be required for closely held partnerships
and for the following additional reasons:
(1) The double tax can act as an additional penalty on the unso-
phisticated shareholder, whereas it may be avoided by the sophisti-
cated.
(2) The earnings and profits generated by the sale of contributed
appreciated property and the negative earnings and profits generated
by the sale of contributed depreciated property are artificial because
they are attributable to factors which occurred before the property
was put in corporate solution.
There would be an added measure of complexity associated with the
implementation of such an anti-assignment device, but the benefits
would also be substantial. The scheme would completely eliminate the
possibility of utilizing the subchapter C corporation as an assignment
of income device. An anti-assignment provision is inherently logical,
particularly in view of the fact that a subchapter C corporation is a
separate taxable entity. Moreover, notwithstanding the increased com-
plexity of such a provision, the complexity inherent in attempts to
heuristically adjust the business bargain to compensate for the poten-
tial tax detriment or benefit would be eliminated.
In the case of the subchapter C corporation with a large number of
investors, it would be desirable (for the same reasons as apply in the
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case of a large number of partners) for the corporation to be able to
elect the allocation treatment, and the Commissioner should have the
authority to require an allocation in cases where there are tax avoid-
ance motivations. Giving the Commissioner the authority to make
such allocations would be a codification of the principles of Lucas v.
Earl and Helvering v. Horst and would add a degree of certainty to the
area by eliminating the Commissioner's reliance on a hodgepodge of
statutory provisions and judicial doctrines, to prevent unmitigated
assignment of income schemes.
Subchapter S Provisions
The potential for assignment of tax detriment or benefit which is
present with partnerships is also present with subchapter S corpora-
tions. The reasons which support a mandatory allocation provision for
closely held partnerships also support a mandatory allocation provi-
sion for subchapter S corporations because the number of shareholders
in a subchapter S corporation is limited to ten. The reasons are pre-
vention of tax avoidance or evasion and protection of the unsophisti-
cated investor. The committee reports do not indicate that Congress
even considered the possibility of the assignment of tax detriment or
benefit on the contribution of property to a subchapter S corpora-
tion."53 The justification for the absence of either a mandatory or elec-
tive provision would apparently be simplification, as is the case with
partnerships. But, simplification may be illusory in view of the possi-
bility of major tax distortions. When the benefits of a mandatory spe-
cial allocation provision are balanced against the cost associated with
the deliberate or inadvertent use of the subchapter S corporation as a
device for the assignment of tax detriment or benefit, one is led to the
unavoidable conclusion that there should also be a mandatory provi-
sion for subchapter S corporations.
There is another reason which supports a mandatory allocation pro-
vision. In the case of a sole shareholder, all of the income items of
the subchapter S corporation will be taxed to the shareholder. Conse-
quently, any precontribution items attributable to the period during
which the shareholder owned the contributed property will automati-
cally be allocated to the shareholder. The subchapter S corporation
with a sole shareholder is, therefore, treated analogously to the partner-
ship with a section 704(c) (2) special allocation. A mandatory allo-
cation provision would simply extend this result to instances of multi-
ple shareholders.
15 H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. REP. No. 1983, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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Summary
The following anti-assignment rules are proposed:
(1) With respect to partnerships, there should be a mandatory
special allocation provision for closely held partnerships and an op-
tional special allocation provision for partnerships with a large num-
ber of partners, say greater than ten. Also, the Commissioner should
have the authority to mandate a special allocation in a case of a part-
nership with a large number of partners where there are tax avoid-
ance or evasion motivations.
(2) With respect to subchapter C corporations, the rules should
be the same as those for partnerships. Whenever there is a special
allocation there would, of course, have to be an adjustment to the
adjusted basis of the contributing shareholder's stock.
(3) With respect to subchapter S corporations, there should be a
mandatory allocation provision.
Double Tax
Comparative Analysis of Potential for a
Double Tax
Outline of Problem
With respect to each of the forms there is a potential for a double
tax in respect of contributed appreciated property. This is caused by the
substituted basis to the investor and the carryover basis to the enterprise.
The investor holds an ownership interest with a built in potential gain, and
the enterprise holds an asset with a built in potential gain. The possi-
bility of a double tax is limited when the enterprise is either a partnership
or subchapter S corporation, and the partnership provisions provide a
mechanism for eliminating the possibility of a double tax. The double tax
may apply to the same investor or may be split between investors. The
incidence of the double tax depends on whether the asset is sold prior to
either the sale of the ownership interest or liquidation of the firm. As will
be pointed out in the discussion of the tax policy implications, the manda-
tory anti-assignment provisions recommended earlier would eliminate
much of the potential for a double tax.
Sale of Appreciated Asset Prior to Sale of
Ownership Interest or Liquidation of Firm
Partnership Provisions. If a partnership disposes of a contributed ap-
preciated asset before the contributing partner disposes of his ownership
interest, the possibility of a double tax on the gain is eliminated, provided
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a section 704(c) (2) special allocation is in effect.114 The gain realized
by the partnership will cause an increase in the adjusted basis of the con-
tributing partner's partnership interests,'15 thereby eliminating the poten-
tial for a double tax. If a section 704(c) (2) special allocation provision
is not in effect there will be a shifting of tax detriment and a possibility of
a double tax on part of the gain.
For instance, assume that A contributes cash of $50K and B contrib-
utes property with a fair market value of $50K and an adjusted basis of
$25K to the AB equal partnership. If the partnership disposed of the
asset at a gain of $25K, other things being equal, each partner would
have income of $12.5K and would increase the adjusted basis of his
partnership interest by $12.5K. A's basis would be $62.5K and B's
basis would be $37.5K. The fair market value of each partner's inter-
est would be $50K. If B sold his interest, he would have a gain of
$12.5K. There would, therefore, have been a tax on gain of $37.5K,
whereas the actual gain built into the asset was only $25K. There
would be an offset, however, if A sold his partnership interest, because
A would have a $12.5K loss on sale. If A held his interest until death,
the loss offset would vanish by reason of the step-down in basis at
death which would be required by section 1014.
If the partnership elected the section 704(c) (2) special allocation
provision the double tax would be eliminated. The $25K gain would
be allocated to B. B's adjusted basis for his partnership interest would
be increased by $25K to $50K. If he then sold his partnership inter-
est, there would be no gain. The same results would obtain if the part-
nership were liquidated.
Subchapter C Provisions. In the case of a subchapter C corpora-
tion, there is a built in possibility of two taxes (and in some cases
three) on the gain in respect of contributed appreciated property. For
instance, if a sole shareholder contributed to a newly organized sub-
chapter C corporation property with a fair market value of $50K and
an adjusted basis of $25K, the basis of his stock would be $25K by
reason of the substituted basis provisions of section 358, and the cor-
poration would have a $25K adjusted basis for the asset by reason of
the application of the section 362(a) carryover basis rule. The fair
market value of his stock would be $50K (assuming a purchaser
would value the stock by reference to the fair market value of the un-
derlying corporate assets). However, because of the potential tax
liability at the corporate level on the gain in respect of the contributed
"I See generally text accompanying Ns. 125-39 supra.
155 I.R.C. § 705.
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asset, the stock could very well have a fair market value lower than
that of the underlying asset.115 For the purposes of discussion here,
however, the fair market value of the stock will be assumed to be equal
to the fair market value of the asset undiminished by the potential tax
liability in respect of the gain. There is an immediate built in poten-
tial gain of $25K at both the shareholder level and the corporate level.
Assuming the asset would be given capital gain treatment on sale
and the corporation's tax rate on such gain would be 30 percent,1'5
the corporation would be subject to a tax of $7.5K on sale of the asset
and it would have earnings and profits of $17.5K.59 Theoretically,
after the sale and payment of the tax, the fair market value of the
corporation would drop to $42.5K, the net after-tax proceeds of the
sale. If the shareholder then sold his stock, he would have a gain of
$17.5K. Assuming the gain would be given capital gain treatment and
the shareholder's capital gain rate was 30 percent,' 9 the tax on such
gain would be $5.25K. The total tax at both the corporate and share-
holder levels would be $12.75K. In the event the corporation had dis-
tributed as a dividend the" after-tax gain of $17.5K, the shareholder
would have had a dividend in that amount because of the corporation's
$17.5K earnings and profits after sale and payment of the tax.'0 This
dividend would have been subject to taxation at the ordinary income
tax rates. If the shareholder was in the 60 percent bracket, the tax
would have been $10.5K, and the total tax at both the corporate and
shareholder levels would have been $18K.
This potential double tax should be contrasted with the one tax
which would have obtained if the investor had contributed the property
to a partnership which elected the 704(c) (2) special allocation
(thereby allocating to him any gain in respect of such contributed
property), and the partnership thereafter sold the property. As a
result of the sale the partner would be taxed on the $25K gain. The
basis of his ownership interest would have been increased by S25K to
$50K. Both the fair market value and adjusted basis of his partnership
interest would then be $50K, and there would only be one tax on the
gain. The tax, assuming the asset would be given capital gain treat-
1-- The value of the stock might be equal to the fair market value of the under-
lying asset minus the present value of the potential tax in respect of the underlying
asseL
117I.R.C. § 1201(a).
15s Earnings and profits, in general, are calculated by subtracting from taxable
income (which in this case is S25K) the tax liability in respect thereof (which
in this case is $7.5K). See Reg. § 1.312-6(b).
159I.R.C. § 1201(b).
16 0 I.R.C. §§ 301, 316.
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ment and the taxpayer was in the 30 percent bracket for capital gains,
would have been $7.5K.
The same results would obtain on the taxable liquidation of the cor-
poration. If there were a nontaxable liquidation the potential for a
double tax would be deferred by reason of the carryover basis.'"
Subchapter S Provisions. The results for subchapter S corporations
are the same as those for the partnership when no section 704(c) (2)
special allocation is in effect."0 2 When there is only one shareholder of
a subchapter S corporation all of the gain will be allocated to him, and
the economic effect is the same as that for a partnership with a section
704(c) (2) special allocation.
Sale of Ownership Interest Prior to Sale of
Asset or Liquidation of Firm
Partnership Provisions. In the case of the partnership provisions,
the possibility of a double tax in respect of contributed property exists
where the contributing partner sells his partnership interests before the
firm sells the contributed asset. In such a case the selling partner will,
by reason of the substituted basis rule, be taxed on the gain at the time
of sale of his partnership interest. The purchasing partner potentially
will be taxed on the same gain when the firm disposes of the asset.
This potential for a double tax can be avoided, however. The partner-
ship can elect under section 754 to increase (pursuant to section
743(a)) the basis of the assets held by the partnership by the amount
of the purchase price attributable to the appreciation in such assets."0 3
If the partnership then sold the assets there would be no tax. The
double tax would have been avoided.
For example, if a contributing partner transferred to a partnership
an asset with a fair market value of $50K and an adjusted basis of
$25K in exchange for a 50 percent partnership interest which he later
sold for $50K, he would have a $25K gain." The purchasing partner
would have a basis of $50K for his partnership interest.' If the sec-
tion 754 election were in effect the partnership's basis of the contrib-
:16 I.R.C. § 732.
112 If a subchapter S corporation sold the property the gain would pass through
to the shareholders pursuant to section 1373, and the basis of the shareholder's
stock would be increased by the amount of the gain pursuant to section 1376,
thereby eliminating the gain in respect of the ownership interest.
1"3 A thorough discussion of the operation of the section 754 election is beyond
the scope of this article. See generally WILLIS at 259-85.
164 I.R.C. § 741.
1 5 I.R.C. § 742.
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uted asset would be increased by $25K pursuant to section 743(a).'"
In the absence of the section 754 election, there would be another tax
in respect of the same gain on the disposition of the asset by the part-
nership. Any gain to the purchasing partner from such disposition
would increase the basis of his partnership interest,"1 thereby generat-
ing the possibility of an offsetting loss deduction when he sold his in-
terest or the partnership was liquidated in a taxable transaction.
The benefit of section 743 is not limited to contributed property.
The potential for double taxation in respect of all assets is eliminated
by section 743.
Subchapter C Provisions. If a contributing shareholder of a sub-
chapter C corporation sells his stock before the corporation sells the
asset, there would only be one tax on the gain with respect to the share-
holder. Assuming capital gains and a 30 percent tax rate, the share-
holder who contributes the asset with a fair market value of S50K and
an adjusted basis of $25K will have a tax liability on sale of his stock
of $7.5K.6 8 This is the same liability which would have obtained if
the shareholder had contributed the property to a partnership which
elected a 704(c) (2) allocation, and the firm sold the asset. Although
the contributing shareholder would avoid the double tax on himself,
the double tax in respect of the same gain still attaches. The corpora-
tion still has the potential gain although there is a new shareholder.
Consequently, when the contributing shareholder sells his stock before
the corporation sells the asset, he is shifting the ultimate burden of the
corporate tax to the purchasing shareholder.
Moreover, if after selling the asset the corporation distributes the
after-tax gain proceeds as a dividend to the new shareholder, he will
bear the burden of a third tax on the dividends which were generated
'OThis assumes (1) that a section 704(c)(2) special allocation provision was
in effect so that in the absence of a section 743 adjustment the purchasing partner
would be charged with all the gain on the assets and (2) that the adjusted basis
of the partnership's other assets was equal to the fair market value of such other
assets.
The section 743 basis adjustment, although made at the partnership level, is in
respect of the purchasing partner's interest only. Thus, for instance, any addi-
tional depreciation or reduced gain attributable to such adjustment would inure
to the benefit of the purchasing partner.
The section 754 election is a double edged sword, it will require under section
743 a basis reduction to the extent the purchase price of a partnership interest is
attributable to partnership assets which have a fair market value less than the
adjusted basis of such assets.
1 ; I.R.C. § 705.
16S This assumes that the value of the stock is equal to the fair market value of
the contributed asset.
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by the gain in respect of the contributed asset.169 The purchasing
shareholder is compensated somewhat, however. To the extent the
corporation's fair market value is decreased by the amount of both
the corporate tax on the gain and the dividend distribution, the share-
holder may get a loss deduction on the sale of his stock or on liquida-
tion of the corporation. If the purchasing shareholder paid $50K for
the stock and the corporation sold the asset for $50K the corporate
tax would be $7.5K. If the corporation distributed the $17.5K after-tax
gain proceeds the shareholder would have a dividend of $17.5K, on
which he would pay a tax at the ordinary income rates. The value of
the corporation, other things being equal, would then be $25K and if
the shareholder sold his stock or the corporation were liquidated, he
would get a loss deduction of $25K.
Subchapter S Provisions. In the case of a subchapter S corporation,
the potential for a double tax when a sale of stock occurs before the
corporation sells the asset is unavoidable, because there is no optional
basis adjustment provision as is the case with partnerships. Thus, if
the stock of a subchapter S corporation is sold prior to the corpora-
tion's sale of the appreciated asset, one tax will be imposed on the sell-
ing shareholder and another on the purchasing shareholder at the time
the subchapter S corporation sells the asset. The purchasing share-
holder will, however, have the possibility of an offsetting loss deduc-
tion on sale of the stock or taxable liquidation of the corporation be-
cause the sale of the asset will cause an increase in the basis of his
stock."7 0
Possibility of Double Loss Deduction
Contributions of depreciated property to a firm will produce results
analogous to but the converse of the results on the contribution of
appreciated property. The potential results can be summarized as
follows:
Partnerships. The potential for a double loss deduction attaches
only in a case where there is a sale of a partnership interest prior to the
sale of the asset by the partnership and there is no section 754 election
in effect. In the case where the section 754 election is in effect, sec-
tion 743 (b) will require a basis reduction analogous to the section
743 (a) basis step up and there would be only one loss.
Subchapter C Corporations. The potential for a double loss deduc-
tion, analogous to the double tax on gain, attaches in both the case
169I.R.C. §§ 301, 316.
170 i.R.C. § 1376(a).
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where the shareholder sells his stock first and in the case where the
corporation sells the asset first.
Subchapter S Corporations. There is a potential for a double loss
deduction when the shareholder sells his stock before the corporaiton
sells the asset. If, however, the corporation sells the asset first, the loss
will lower the shareholder's basis for his stock, thereby preventing the
possibility of a double loss.
Tax Policy Implications of Potential
Double Tax
Dimensions of Problem
In the discussion of the Tax Policy Implications of the Assignment
of Tax Detriment or Benefit it was proposed, inter alia, that the pre-
contribution gain or loss in respect of contributed property be allo-
cated directly to the contributing investor. This proposal applies to
each of the three forms. This is in essence the treatment which is
presently accorded in both the case of a partnership which has elected
the section 704(c) (2) allocation and a subchapter S corporation with
a sole shareholder. This proposal would automatically eliminate the
double tax in respect of contributed property in cases where the enter-
prise disposes of the property before the investors dispose of their own-
ership interests.
The question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether the section
754 optional basis adjustment provision for partnerships should be
extended to subchapter C and S corporations with respect to contrib-
uted property. It must be emphasized that consideration will not be
given here to the question of whether an optional basis adjustment
should also be available for noncontributed property which is the case
for partnerships.
Genesis of Double Tax Problem
With respect to noncontributed property, the double tax for sub-
chapter C corporations has been the general rule since the enactment
of the first Revenue Act under the sixteenth amendment. There have
been certain exceptions to this general rule. One of the first judicially
developed exceptions (now codified in section 311 ) originated in Gen-
eral Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,'1 which stands for the
proposition that a corporation does not have income on the distribu-
tion of appreciated property. This rule of nonrecognition also applies
-1296 U.S. 200 (1935), reversing 74 F.2d 972 (4th Cir.).
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to liquidating distributions (now codified as section 336). Precontri-
bution gain was not subjected to a double tax until 1924 with the en-
actment of section 204(a) (8) of the Revenue Act of 1924.172 Sec-
tion 204(a) (8) is the predecessor of section 362(a). It provided that
a corporation would have a carryover basis for property received in
an organization transaction. The purpose of the provision was to check
evasions.' The effect of the provision was explained:
Under the existing law, if A owns an asset which cost him $10,000 and is
now worth $50,000, he may transfer it to the X corporation in exchange
for all the stock of the X corporation (no gain or loss from the exchange
being recognized either under the existing law or under the bill) and the
new corporation may take up the asset on its books for the purpose of
determining gain or loss from subsequent sale and depreciation and deple-
tion of $50,000, its fair market value at the date of transfer. Paragraph
(8) of the bill provides that the basis of the asset so transferred shall be
$10,000.174
Before 1924 there was no tax at the corporate level on precontri-
bution gain. The Revenue Act of 1921 which first provided nonrecog-
nition treatment for contribution transactions did, however, provide
for a substituted basis to the contributing shareholders. 115 The sub-
stituted basis provision was described as a safeguard. 170 Presumably
the safeguard was aimed at the possibility of a shareholder avoiding
gain on sale of an asset by contributing the asset in a nonrecognition
exchange to a newly organized corporation, taking a fair market value
basis for the stock, and then selling the stock. The substituted basis
provision prevented such schemes. However, since the corporation
took a fair market value basis for the asset, the tax could be avoided
by having the corporation sell the asset. The purpose of section
204(a) (8) was to prevent this side of the scheme. After 1924 tax-
payers could no longer avoid tax on gain by contributing appreciated
property to a corporation.
In preventing possible tax avoidance schemes the substitute and
carryover basis provisions operate in tandem to produce a double tax
in respect of precontribution gain. There is no indication in the legis-
172 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 204(a) (8), 43 Stat. 253.
113S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1924); 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
253; SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861,
at 704 (1938).
174 Ibid.
1 75 Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(d)(1).
'-6S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921); 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
189; SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861,
at 801 (1938).
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lative history that Congress intended to impose this double tax. The
legislative history only indicates that Congress intended to eliminate
the possible evasion of the one tax.
Elimination of Double Tax on
Precontribution Gain
As was indicated previously, adoption of the proposals with respect
to the assignment of tax detriment or benefit would eliminate the
double tax problem in the case where the enterprise disposes of the
contributed property prior to either the sale of the ownership interests
by the investor or the liquidation of the enterprise. This is so because
the gain would be attributed to the contributing investor who would
receive a basis increase in the amount of the gain. The question,
therefore, is whether a section 754 optional adjustment provision with
respect to contributed property should be available to the purchasing
shareholders of both subchapter C and S corporations.
Having decided that it is sound from a tax policy standpoint to im-
pute precontribution gain (or loss) directly to the contributing in-
vestor, there would seem to be no sound reason for not providing for
the elimination of the potential double tax in cases where the con-
tributing investor first disposes of his ownership interest. If, for no
other reason, an optional basis adjustment provision should be adopted
for the purpose of eliminating the structural problem which would
arise as a result of the adoption of the proposal for imputing pre-
contribution gain or loss to the contributing investor. Once the con-
tributing investor has disposed of his ownership interest, or any part
thereof, he has in effect cashed in on his precontribution gain or loss
or a part thereof. The optional basis adjustment provision would
merely take account of this by making an appropriate basis adjust-
ment to the contributed property. Another reason for providing for
such a provision is that it does not appear that Congress ever consid-
ered the question of whether it is proper to apply a double tax to pre-
contribution gain; it appears that precontribution gain in the corporate
context was inadvertently subjected to a double tax.
It might be wise to make basis adjustments with respect to con-
tributed property mandatory for each type of enterprise, unless the
enterprise and the investors elect not to have the benefit. This would
protect the unsophisticated purchasing investor.
The adoption of a basis adjustment provision with respect to pre-
contribution gain or loss would not generate new possibilities for tax
avoidance. It would promote a degree of equity primarily in cases
where a shareholder is selling less than all the stock of a corporation
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which was recently organized. In the case of a sale of 100 percent of
the stock, there is presently available the alternative of a section 337
liquidation which permits a corporation to sell its assets (with certain
specified exceptions) without recognizing gain on the sale if the sale
is followed by a taxable liquidation. Thus, if the assets are sold under
section 337, the selling shareholders will be taxed on only one gain
and the purchaser will not have the potential for a gain since the basis
in the assets purchased will equal the amount paid therefor. From a
tax policy standpoint, it may be more compelling to provide a basis
adjustment provision than a section 337 provision, because the for-
mer will only eliminate a double tax on precontribution gain whereas
the latter eliminates the double tax on all gain. As a corollary of a
basis adjustment provision there would have to be an imputation to
the selling shareholder of any recaptured gain (under section 1245 or
section 1250) which would be eliminated by the step-up in basis.
Conclusion
Contributions of appreciated or depreciated property to partner-
ships, subchapter C corporations and subchapter S corporations should
generate the same tax results.
Nonrecognition treatment should continue to apply to all the in-
vestors on the organization of a new enterprise. Nonrecognition treat-
ment should also apply to contributions to operating enterprises of
(1) massive amounts of capital by groups of investors and (2) sub-
stantial amounts of capital by a single investor. The determination of
whether a contribution is massive or substantial should be determined
by reference to the value of the outstanding ownership interests re-
ceived for the property contributed. Contributions of property in
exchange for at least 50 percent of the ownership interests determined
as of immediately after the contribution should be considered massive
contributions and contributions in exchange for at least 25 percent
of the ownership interests determined as of immediately after the con-
tribution should be considered substantial contributions. These rules
would bring the law with respect to recognition treatment for contribu-
tion transactions more in line with the rationales which support non-
recognition and recognition treatment, respectively. Those transac-
tions which the rules would treat as nonrecognition contributions both
(1) more nearly resemble mere changes in form of ownership as
opposed to exchanges amounting to pure sales and (2) are the types
of contributions which are likely to have a significant impact on busi-
ness development. Therefore, such contributions should be facilitated
by exemption from the general rule of recognition. On the other hand,
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 3 1:TAX LAW REVIEW
1975] IMPLICATIONS OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY 97
those transactions which would be given recognition treatment more
nearly resemble exchanges amounting to pure sales and, therefore,
should be treated as taxable.
In those cases in which nonrecognition treatment is accorded to
contribution transactions, there is a potential for the assignment from
the contributing investor to the noncontributing investor of tax detri-
ment in the case of a contribution of appreciated property and tax
benefit in the case of a contribution of depreciated property. In an
arm's length transaction between informed investors an adjustment in
the business bargain will be made to take account of the assignment of
tax detriment or benefit. There are at least three instances where there
will not be an adjustment: (1) when the tax effect of the assignment
is de minimis, (2) when the parties are unaware of the tax distortion
and (3) when the parties are deliberately effecting a scheme for the
assignment of tax detriment or benefit. It necessarily follows, there-
fore, that in all cases where the tax effect is meaningful, an adjustment
will be made or, in the event the investors are either unsophisticated
or are engaging in tax avoidance schemes, should be made. Instances
involving unsophisticated investors or tax scheming investors in most
cases will arise with closely held enterprises. The most appropriate
manner of adjusting for the tax detriment or tax benefit element on a
contribution of appreciated or depreciated property is the section
704(c) (2) special allocation provision which is available to partner-
ships. Such a special allocation provision should be (1) mandatory
with respect to all (a) closely held partnerships, (b) closely held sub-
chapter C corporations and (c) subchapter S corporations; and (2)
optional with respect to all partnerships and subchapter C corpora-
tions with a large number of investors. Also, in the case of partner-
ships and subchapter C corporations with a large number of investors,
the Commissioner should have the authority to mandate a special allo-
cation where there are tax avoidance or evasion motivations. The
adoption of these rules with respect to subchapter C corporations
would also require the adoption of a provision analogous to section
705 which would adjust the adjusted basis of the contributing in-
vestor's stock in the amount of the specifically allocated gain or loss.
In order to promote theoretical consistency with the above proposal
for special allocations of tax detriment and benefit and for the further
reason of eliminating the double tax or double loss with respect to pre-
contribution gain or loss, an optional basis adjustment provision (anal-
ogous to the section 743 provision available to partnerships) should
be applicable to both subchapter C and S corporations with respect
to precontribution gain or loss.
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